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The present study examines the evolution of nuclear strategy with particular
emphasis on the capacity of U.S./NATO sea-based non-strategic nuclear forces. The current
trend in NATO towards a certain denuclearization of the Central European states might
well place an increased reliance on sea-based theater nuclear weapons to counter Soviet
theater nuclear forces in the Western Soviet Union. The present work analyzes he policy
background of the NATO nuclear strategy from a European perspective in light of recent
problems as a necessary precondition to an understanding of the more concrete issues of
hardware. Although the U.S. Navy's nuclear-capable Tomahawk land attack cruise missile
(TLAM/N) remains a potent and flexible nuclear strike asset, it is best suited for heavily
defended high value fixed targets. Emphasis on offensive mobility in a future conflict will
make carrier-based aircraft a more decisive platform from which to prosecute and destroy
high value mobile targets. However, an analysis of the U.S. Navy's non-strategic nuclear
forces reveals substantial deficiencies when compared with those of the Soviet Union. A
declining U.S. Navy nuclear stockpile of air-deliverable strike weapons in combination with
the lack of a long-range nuclear-capable stealth aircraft weakens the credibility of the
aircraft carrier battle group as a nuclear deterrent force.
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I . INTRODUCTION
Dramatic events in late 1989 have transformed the
strategic landscape in Central Europe. The most basic
objectives of the Atlantic Alliance having been achieved, a
unified German state within NATO joins in a far reaching
review of the basic purposes, strategies, and organization of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A review of the size
and tasks of the Alliance's nuclear forces looks forward to a
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in strategy and
substantial reductions of nuclear forces, while at the same
time acknowledging the essential role they fulfill in a
strategy designed to preserve peace.
The new alliance strategy that will succeed flexible
response and forward defense is only now emerging, yet it
appears clear that the principles of flexible response -- to
deter aggression and defend alliance territory, should
deterrence fail remain capable to respond in kind at every
level along the continuum of deterrence -- shall endure. Yet,
the elimination of ground-based intermediate nuclear forces
(INF) , in addition to the imminent withdrawal of short-range
nuclear forces (SNF) will make it more difficult for NATO to
maintain credible and flexible response options. The U.S. Navy
is more than likely to be called upon to provide the solution,
thereby increasing NATO's reliance on U.S. non-strategic
nuclear forces.
This creates a profound dilemma for the U.S. Navy. While
the likelihood of war with the Soviet Union has been greatly
reduced, the Soviet Union remains the principle U.S. nuclear
threat. Significantly, the trend toward a certain
denuclearization in Central Europe will strengthen Soviet
comparative advantages in geographic and mobilization factors
and leave political military outcomes to turn more decisively
on the nonnuclear correlation of forces. While recent arms
control successes will substantially reduce the size of the
armed forces of the Soviet Union, they will nevertheless
remain the largest military force in Europe.
It is widely recognized that Soviet sea-based nuclear
forces are far more robust than those of the U.S. Navy.
Consequently, it is generally agreed that it is in our best
interest to avoid nuclear war-at-sea vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. To accomplish this goal we have relied heavily on the
threat of retaliation against the Soviet Russian homeland as
a deterrent against Soviet naval "first-use" of nuclear
weapons at sea. Meanwhile, NATO's strategic concepts
specifically leave open the option of "first-use" of nuclear
weapons, albeit as a "last resort," to prevent a looming
conventional defeat in defense of NATO territory. The inherent
contradiction between these two policies would make NATO's
reliance on sea-based nuclear weapons seem incredible.
It has been a long standing goal of Soviet foreign and
military policy to prevent NATO from employing nuclear
weapons. And many would argue that it has been the credible
threat to use these weapons that has kept the peace in Europe
over the past four decades. Although nuclear weapons may serve
largely as political instruments, properly formulated military
options are essential for enhancing the political credibility
of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee.
This thesis examines the increased role of U.S. sea-based
non-strategic nuclear forces in support of NATO's emerging
strategic concepts. It begins with an attempt to better
understand the reasons behind the developing trend toward
denuclearization in Central Europe which appear to stem
largely from a "delegitimization" of nuclear deterrence
policies in Germany. The doctrine of flexible response is
reviewed as well as the military-political issues that will
shape future strategy. The non-strategic nuclear balance in
Europe will be examined with special emphasis on the
capabilities of U.S. naval nuclear weapons stockpiles and
nuclear-capable air strike assets. Finally, conclusions are
reached as to whether a credible sea-based non-strategic
nuclear deterrent force is possible.
II. THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE
The withdrawal of Soviet forces from East-central Europe
has once again brought the issue of nuclear weapons
deployments to the forefront of alliance politics. On 3 May
1990 President George Bush announced his decision to forego
the follow-on-to-Laiice missile program in addition to the
cancellation of any further modernization of U.S. nuclear
artillery shells deployed in Europe. These steps were followed
two months later by a proposal that was announced at the July
1990 NATO London Summit meeting to eliminate all nuclear
artillery shells from Europe, in exchange for reciprocal
action by the Soviet Union. This unprecedented series of
events is a reflection not only of the significant decline in
the perceived Soviet threat to Western security, but also the
willingness of the Atlantic Alliance to reinforce Soviet
initiatives and reduce their own defense expenditures.
Once the remaining Soviet forces stationed in the eastern
portion of united Germany have been completely withdrawn
(Soviet troops are scheduled to leave by the end of 1994) , and
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is fully
implemented, some observers have suggested that U.S. nuclear
weapons also be withdrawn from Central Europe. (Halperin,
1990, sec. 4, p. 19) Others, however, would argue that "strictly
speaking the can be no exclusively 'conventional stability.'
A credible nuclear component remains necessary even in times
of conventional disarmament, if war as an instrument of
politics is to be excluded." (Kaiser, 1989, p. 136)
Chances are there may still be some dual-capable medium-
range aircraft based in Europe -- specifically, U.S. F/B-llls
stationed in the United Kingdom along with the possibility of
adding some F-15 Eagles to provide tactical support. But these
aircraft have sometimes been criticized for being inadequate
to provide full target coverage against increasingly
sophisticated Soviet air defenses. (Daalder, 1988, p. 277) Of
course, NATO would like to modernize these aircraft by
providing them with short-range nuclear tactical air-to-
surface missiles (TASM) which would make them all the more
effective. However, many European statesmen view the
introduction of a TASM as politically untenable in the "New
Europe." One aide to German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich
Genscher, for example, called the idea simply "ridiculous."
(Friedman, 1990, p.A7)
By far the largest number of U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe are kept in the Western part of Germany, roughly 64
percent of the total U.S. nuclear stockpile in NATO. Sources
outside the U.S. government estimate there are about 1,285
nuclear artillery shells and nearly 500 air-deliverable
gravity bombs deployed there. (Norris c , 1990, p. 48) This
compares to approximately 15 nuclear artillery shells and 200
bombs in Italy, 60 artillery shells and 25 bombs in Greece,
ten artillery shells and 25 bombs in the Netherlands, and 80
artillery shells and 200 bombs in Turkey. The Italian and
Dutch governments have expressed a desire to eliminate the
short-range weapons citing the fact that such weapons could
only now fall on their newly democratic neighbors to the East.
(Economist, 1990, p. 48) In addition, Germany's position in the
heart of Europe has generally made it the key to dominating
the politics of Europe. Moreover, much of NATO's strategy has
been guided by assumptions concerning West German political
and military needs. (Asmus, 1989, p.v) Thus, the most
important decision among NATO's non-nuclear members on whether
or not to maintain air deliverable gravity bombs and/or accept
new tactical air-to-surface missiles will take place in
Germany
.
A June 1990 Economist/Los Angeles Times poll in Western
Germany found that there is little public support for the
deployment of nuclear weapons in Germany. More than half of
those Germans polled (54%) believe nuclear weapons should be
removed from German soil. This is reduced only slightly (to
42%), when it is pointed out that the United States might
decide to withdraw its troops from the country without nuclear
protection. When asked whether the respondents thought that as
a military deterrent only a few nuclear weapons should remain
in Germany, that is, only the types that are launched from
aircraft, not the land-based missiles, almost half (49%),
answered that an air-launched missile option was not a good
solution. {Economist , 1990, p. 46)
It has been postulated that a tendency toward a certain
"delegitimization" of nuclear deterrence has emerged in some
important sectors of the elite and attentive publics in some
Western countries such as Germany. This "delegitimization" has
been defined a "reduced confidence in the reliability and
safety of nuclear deterrence arrangements and lessened
certainty about the practical prudence, strategic necessity,
and/or moral legitimacy of posing nuclear threats to
adversaries." (Yost, 1990, p. 487) Of these elements, NATO has
relied most heavily upon the argument of strategic necessity
to legitimize its nuclear deterrence policies. For nearly four
decades NATO has used the compensatory function of nuclear
weapons as the central argument in justifying and politically
implementing nuclear deterrence. Since the Warsaw Pact's
conventional superiority was real, this argument was
convincing even to many skeptics. (Kaiser, 1989, p. 135) As
long as this perceived threat existed, arguments of those
favoring the elimination of nuclear weapons as well as
questions about the legitimacy of nuclear deployments could be
overcome in the name of effective deterrence. No doubt that is
why today many politicians believe that nuclear arms in
Western Europe can be reduced, or eliminated, given the build-
down to near conventional parity that will accompany
implementation of the CFE agreement.
The origins of this delegitimization of nuclear deterrence
in West Germany are not well understood, however, some of the
apparent changes in contemporary attitudes have their roots in
the more distant past, to be sure. Two distinct periods in the
brief history of German nuclear policy appear to have made a
lasting impression for all future German nuclear policy
decisions, and shall be discussed here. First, is the initial
decision process to accept NATO nuclear weapons deployments in
the mid-1950s. Second, the debate surrounding NATO's 1979
"dual track" decision and the deployment of Intermediate-range
Nuclear Force missile that followed.
A. THE ORIGINS OF WEST GERMAN NUCLEAR POLICY
International developments in the late 1940s and early
1950s suggested that the Soviet Union intended to capitalize
on the defeat of Nazi Germany to shift the global balance of
power in its favor. Following the Berlin Crisis in 1948, the
Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb ended the United States
nuclear monopoly and created an atmosphere that grew even more
disturbing for the West when the North Koreans attacked South
Korea on 25 June 1950. The United States along with its
weakened British an French allies worried that "what appeared
to be a Soviet-led feint in Asia was the prelude to a
worldwide Blitzkrieg." (Abenheim, 1988, p. 42) It was unlikely
that the recently established North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) could prevent a Soviet advance to the
English Channel and the Pyrenees.
American ground troops that remained on the continent were
considered inadequate to fight a Third World War, leading most
U.S. planners to conclude that the best option would be a
strategic retreat--from the continent if necessary--followed
by a U.S. led retaliation with atomic weapons clearing the way
for another Normandy type re-invasion of the continent.
Europeans privy to these plans rejected the notion of any
retreat, calling instead for a strengthening of the Atlantic
Alliance. With this goal in mind the North Atlantic Council
held its ninth session in Lisbon, Portugal, in February 1952.
At the Lisbon meeting the allied ministers adopted, with
relatively little discussion, the report of the so-called
"Three Wise Men, " --Averell Harriman of the United States, Sir
Edwin Plowden of the United Kingdom, and Jean Monnet of
France--on the economic burdens of rearmament and future plans
of the alliance. Although NATO's military plans for the
defense of Europe called for approximately 9,000 aircraft and
100 divisions their report concluded that a total of 50
divisions with 4,000 aircraft and strong naval forces was the
most NATO could aspire to by the end of 1952. (Richardson, 19,
p. 32) Additionally, it was understood by the Council that
these forces needed to be increased to essentially 96
divisions by 1954. To do this the West would need the
Germans
.
The Lisbon force goals, as they came to be known, were an
attempt by the allies to address the postwar realization that
Soviet de-mobilization had been much less thorough than
expected. United States intelligence estimates of Soviet
military strength in Europe, although crude and imprecise,
consistently assessed the number of Soviet divisions to be
175-200, with 20,000 operational aircraft scattered throughout
the region. The Soviets were also credited with having more
than 400 submarines, with which they could make resupply and
reinforcement from North America very hazardous. To these
estimates could also be added the forces of East European
satellite states, consisting of 75 to 80 divisions and about
2500 operational aircraft. 1 For the Western allies, the Lisbon
force goals amounted to little more than wishful thinking
considering that all were faced with enormous postwar
financial and resource burdens, not to mention European
colonial interests in North Africa and the Middle East which
also diverted a considerable number of military and financial
resources away from NATO purposes
.
In the United States, a newly elected President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, having recently returned to the U.S. from his
position as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) , immediately began to craft a national security
1 Soviet force level data extracted from remarks made by
General Alfred M. Gruenther, SACEUR, before the Bonn Economic
Policy Club, on May 9th, 1956, as published in the NATO
Letter, Vol. 4, No. 6, (June 1956), 36.
10
strategy for the United States that could meet the Soviet
threat while at the same time avoiding any serious weakening
of our nations economy with relatively costly conventional
military capabilities. The resulting U.S. strategy placed
increased reliance on the use of nuclear armaments to
rationalize significant manpower reductions (the most
expensive component of the military) . This strategy was set
forth in October 1953 in a National Security Council paper
(NSC 162/2) on Basic National Security Policy, also known in
public circles as the "New Look." Eisenhower's "New Look" was
introduced to the public by Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles on January 12, 1954. In a statement before the Council
on Foreign Relations, Secretary Dulles emphasized that in
order to get "a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost," the
United States had decided to "depend primarily upon a great
capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of or
choosing." (U.S. Department of State, 1954, p. 103) In economic
terms it was argued that the U.S. had opted for a strategy
that offered "more bang for the buck."
In early 1954, General Alfred M. Gruenther, Eisenhower's
replacement as SACEUR, presided over a study of the
feasibility of shifting NATO's strategy to place primary focus
on nuclear weapons in keeping with the spirit of the New Look.
Though never declassified, the results of the study were
leaked to the press and by all accounts, the resulting report




(Schwartz, 1983, p. 32) This classified report
became the basis for the North Atlantic Council's ominous
December 1954 endorsement of a "New Look" for NATO, a strategy
of massive retaliation using nuclear weapons "of all sorts"
against the Warsaw Pact once attacked, irrespective of whether
or not the Pact used them. (Schwartz, 1983, p. 32) The formal
NATO document which outlined the new strategy (MC 48 in NATO
parlance) , was titled "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO
Military Strength for the Next Few Years." This title seemed
to imply that the new NATO strategy was only a temporary
measure until NATO conventional forces could be sufficiently
strengthened and did not constitute, at least to some European
representatives, that nuclear weapons represented a permanent
solution to NATO's strategic dilemma.
Concurrent with this transformation in NATO's strategic
doctrine was the rapid technological development of tactical
nuclear weaponry. Armaments such as nuclear capable 280mm
artillery, smaller and lighter air-deliverable nuclear gravity
bombs, anti-aircraft missiles, and Mace and Matador atomic
cruise missiles were rapidly becoming part of the allied
arsenal in this period. General Gruenther directed the NATO
planning staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE) to formulate a defensive strategy utilizing these
newly acquired capabilities as guided by the precepts
established in NSC 162/2. Thus, between 1953 and 1956 the
American led strategists at SHAPE worked on a new approach for
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the defense of Europe. Their findings indicated that: "In an
atomic defense, the brunt of needed forces are those to
service the firepower, to force the enemy to form a target,
and to identify the target. The Lisbon force goals were more
than sufficient for these requirements." (Richardson, 1981,
p. 41) The proposed strategy would require only 30 combat ready
allied divisions so long as the divisions would be armed and
equipped with the most modern tactical nuclear weapons. The
purpose of allied ground forces in the new strategy, according
to Brigadier General Robert C. Richardson III, USAF, a planner
in SHAPE Headquarters from 1952 to 1955, was to effectively
"shield" NATO territory in a defensive holding action using
tactical nuclear weapons as necessary, pending the outcome of
the strategic nuclear battle, which of course was to be
conducted largely between the two superpowers. (Richardson,
1981, p. 41) In this manner the twin concepts of deterrence and
defense could be united into a single coherent strategy. After
a lengthy review process, the NATO Standing Group formally
adopted the new tactical nuclear plans as official NATO
doctrine in the form of documents MC 14/2 and MC 70 eventually
leading to a revision of the Lisbon force goals downward by
1957. (Schwartz, 1983, p. 32)
In the midst of this fundamental policy shift the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization formally admitted two new
alliance members: Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany.
For Germany in particular, the May 5, 1955, accession into
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NATO was an important development not only because NATO
membership brought with it increased political status for the
Federal Republic in Western Europe but also because it
increased the Adenauer government's chances of achieving its
two other major foreign policy goals: security and German
reunification. Along with these political gains however, came
genuine liabilities as well. NATO was rapidly becoming a
nuclear alliance, a reality for which the Adenauer government
seemed reluctant to acknowledge as part of the alliance
package
.
Critics have charged that, "Throughout the 1955-56 period
Adenauer and [Defense Minister] Blank seemed confused about
the implications of the New Look for West Germany." (Schwartz,
1983, p. 43) However, it appears that during this same period
Washington issued tacit assurances to Adenauer and other
European leaders that if war did break out, "first priority"
would be given by the American leadership to launching the
U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers to "blunt" the Soviet
initial threat while NATO ground forces held the line along
the Central Front. 2 From a European perspective, such a move
would rapidly escalate the conflict into a global strategic
2 For a detailed account of U.S. nuclear policy during
the Eisenhower administration see David Alan Rosenberg, "The
Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy,
1945-1960," International Security, Vol.7, No . 4 , (Spring
1983) .
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nuclear exchange between the two superpowers, largely
overshadowing any holding action along the Central Front.
Additionally, many West German government officials and
military leaders were convinced that an adequate conventional
defense could be mounted to counter what Germans perceived as
the major threat to European security--the possibility of a
large-scale Soviet invasion, most probably a massive tank
assault, in the Central region. Discussions had taken place as
early as October 1950, when Chancellor Adenauer directed a
group of his closest military advisers, led by former armor
General Gerhard von Schwerin, to covertly devised a plan of
action for German rearmament and defense within a European
security framework. The plan, as it was described in the so-
called "Himmerod memorandum, " suggested using 12 German
armored divisions integrated with the Western allies as part
of a mobile-enveloping force. These units would be deployed as
near to the interzonal border as operations would allow and
would constitute in NATO terms a "forward defense." (Abenheim,
1988, p. 54) Given the country's narrow territorial dimensions,
the Federal Republic's strategic dilemma has always been that
it cannot trade space for time. This left little choice for
German strategists but to pursue a forward strategy.
Indeed, in 1955 West German rearmament plans called for
the build-up of 12 large armored divisions designed to
confront a massive Soviet tank assault. NATO's American
strategists argued that these divisions should be somewhat
15
smaller in size to allow for the greater mobility required on
the atomic battlefield, that would also give NATO commanders
increased flexibility to detach and disperse units more
readily if and when their units should come under nuclear
attack. German Army officials were reluctant to comply with
the changes suggested by NATO, nevertheless, by the end of
1955, under pressure from the civilian leadership within the
Defense Ministry, they agreed to make the requisite changes
that would construct a West German Army more compatible with
the NATO New Look. (Schwartz, 19 83, p. 43)
The commanders at SHAPE wasted little time in
demonstrating alliance strategic concepts to their new West
German partner. Operation "Carte Blanche," held in June 1955,
just one month after the Federal Republic became an alliance
member, simulated the Western allies response to Soviet
tactical nuclear attacks against military targets in the Low
countries, northeastern France, and the Federal Republic of
Germany. The attack scenario was based on an assumption that
Soviet TU-16 "Badger" medium range bombers, which became
available in large numbers in early 1955, would lead an attack
by dropping atomic bombs on primary allied airfields and
command facilities. The American led planners at SHAPE
imagined that if the Soviets decided to risk a life and death
struggle, they would use atomic weapons at once, and in full
force. The allied response simulated dropping more than 100
targets between Hamburg and Munich, resulting in 1.7 million
16
Germans killed, 3.5 million wounded, and countless additional
casualties resulting from fallout. (Kelleher, 1975, p. 40) The
event forced the issue of NATO's nuclear strategy onto German
consciousness, creating widespread unrest and agitation in the
public and volatile debate in parliament that lasted for
several years to come.
Catherine Kelleher, in her book Germany and the Politics
of Nuclear Weapons, which is based largely on personal
interviews with German Defense Ministry officials and
government elites between 1965 and 1966, describes the German
military reaction to Carte Blanche as "cool and offhand,"
revealing "after all, nothing revolutionary, just evidence of
new levels of destructive power." (Kelleher, 1975, p. 40) The
majority view of these officials, most of whom were army
officers, was that "Carte Blanche reflected all too well the
limited combat experience and American predilection for
airpower that had fostered NATO's ill-advised decision of
December 1954." (Kelleher, 1975, p. 41) Most officials held the
belief that a future conflict would broadly resemble the
outline of World War II except on a larger, more destructive
scale. In light of the perceived threat to European security
and with consideration towards the probable character of a
future conflict, most West German defense officials concluded
that: "Nuclear weapons would not play a decisive role in such
a conflict; their primary significance would be in the
strategic sphere, especially in retaliatory attacks against
17
the Soviet homeland. The new tactical nuclear weapons--about
which very little was known-- might provide increased strength
once problems of radiation effects, reliability, and logistics
could be solved." (Kelleher, 1975, p. 41)
The West German Army clearly did not perceive a tactical
advantage to be gained from the "instantaneous" use of
tactical nuclear weapons to counter the Soviet threat given
the unresolved problems associated with the use of nuclear
munitions. Although they held open the prospect that tactical
nuclear weapons might someday prove useful as a force
multiplier, their overriding concerns about the safety and
reliability of these new weapons made them impractical for use
on what they considered to be predominantly a conventional
battlefield. These officials were also quick to note that
nuclear weapons were best suited for the strategic level of
conflict which they agreed would be conducted between the two
superpowers
.
Debate in the Bundestag, following decisions to rearm the
Bundeswehr and to join NATO, shifted from conventional
rearmament to the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in
Germany. Throughout the Summer of 1956 the government argued
for a build-up of conventional forces. In July, however, a New
York Times report charged that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, had circulated a memorandum
proposing the withdrawal of significant numbers of American
troops from Europe. The report triggered alarm in Bonn because
18
without substantial numbers of American ground forces, the
conventional defense of the central region, still considered
feasible by some Defense Ministry officials, would be nearly
impossible. The American government denied any intention to
reduce or remove American forces without the prior approval of
NATO, but did not repudiate the central objective of the
Radford Plan: to substitute nuclear deterrence for
conventional defence. (Osgood, 1962, p. 42)
In response to this objective, Chancellor Adenauer
strongly criticized the NATO shift in emphasis from
conventional forces to nuclear arms as a "mistake, " further
warning that to counter an East German invasion of West
Germany with nuclear weapons would almost certainly "trigger
an intercontinental rocket attack." (Osgood, 1962, p. 41)
Although this warning came before the advent of Soviet or
American ballistic missile capabilities, causing some to
wonder about Adenauer's faculties, his message of escalation
was clear. Wolfram Hanrieder noted a subtle shift in the Bonn
governments position "from arguing that German rearmament
would help deter Soviet aggression to stressing that it would
help in deterring nuclear war." (Hanreider, 1989, p. 42)
Although still unequivocally opposed to atomic armaments
in his public pronouncements, Dr. Adenauer soon decided that
Germany would best be served by joining the overwhelming trend
toward nuclear deterrence. The Chancellor was in receipt of
enormous domestic political pressure from within his own
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Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party
the Christian Socialist Union (CDU) to cut away from the
national and international liabilities which critics had felt
Minister of Defense Blank's "ineptitude" produced. (Kelleher,
1975, p. 47) Late in September, Bonn reacted to the pressure
with a cabinet announcement to reduce the conscription period
from 18 to 12 months. This measure would effectively reduce
the planned size of the Bundeswehr's total force from a goal
of 500,000 men, set in early Summer, to 325,000 men. The
following month it was also announced that Franz Josef
Strauss, a CSU defense expert and Cabinet Minister of Atomic
Matters (noted for his early appreciation of the new NATO
strategy and forceful advocacy of a German role in the
disposition of alliance nuclear weapons), would replace Blank
as Defense Minister.
In October 1956 a series of international events further
prompted Chancellor Adenauer to seek even closer ties with
NATO and the United States. First, the Suez crisis in the
Middle East (in which the Soviet leadership threatened to rain
nuclear missiles on London and Paris) underscored Germany's
reliance on U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, and; Second, the
Soviet use of force to crush the Hungarian uprising exposed
Soviet attempts toward a peaceful settlement of the "German
Question" as insincere. These recent international events
reaffirmed Adenauer's conviction that Germany's future was
tied to the West. It became clear that without U.S. strategic
20
nuclear weapons and the threat of their use the defense of
Berlin and all that it stood for would be nearly impossible.
By the end of the year, a turnaround of Adenauer's nuclear
policy was effectively complete when the Federal Republic
joined Britain and France in requesting access to U.S. nuclear
weapons under NATO auspices. (Schwartz, 1983, p. 44)
A resounding victory for the CDU/CSU in the third federal
elections to the Bundestag in September 1957 demonstrated
public confidence in the decisions and policies of the
Adenauer government despite its recent reversal on nuclear
deterrence issues. Bonn, riding the tide of approval from the
Fall election, continued to press forward with the rearmament
program of the Bundeswehr, which was scheduled to include arms
Adenauer euphemistically termed "the most modern weapons."
At a November press conference, Defense Minister Strauss
declared that since the alliance had assigned German forces a
"fundamentally tactical mission," the only types of modern
equipment sought by Germany would be "tactical weapons." More
specifically the German government was interested in dual-
capable "anti-tank rockets, surface-to-surface tactical
missiles, guided missiles for air defense, and missiles which
could replace tactical bombers and long-range artillery, that
is with a range under 1,250 miles." (Kelleher, 1975, p. 97)
This range limitation was an important distinction for the FRG
because it would prohibit direct attacks on Soviet territory
from German soil. The very next month Strauss took this
21
atomic shopping list with him on an official visit to the
United States. Upon his return he announced the government's
intent to equip the West German armed forces with Matador C
nuclear capable cruise missiles and Nike-Ajax dual-capable air
defense missiles, both under dual key arrangements with the
Americans. (Schwartz, 1983, p. 71) In keeping with the
fundamentally tactical mission of the Federal Republic, the
Defense Minister quietly turned down a broad U.S. offer to
deploy Thor and Jupiter Intermediate- and Medium-Range
Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs and MRBSs) in Germany, thought by
Adenauer and others to be inappropriate. Nevertheless, the
Strauss announcement touched off a firestorm of anti-nuclear
criticism and sparked one of the most heated and emotional
parliamentary debates in the short history of the Federal
Republic
.
In the Bundestag, the Christian Democrats, led by Adenauer
and Strauss, used two principal arguments to justify their
advocacy of nuclear armaments. The first was that German
forces must possess the "most modern weapons," equal to those
of other NATO shield countries lest the Federal Republic would
become the weak link in NATO's defensive structure, ultimately
inviting the Warsaw Pact to strike at this weakness. This
line of reasoning remained consistent with Adenauer's
established foreign policy goal of achieving equality for the
West German state among the other West European allies,
arguing that a failure to obtain nuclear weapons for Germany
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would undermine the government's efforts. A second CDU/CSU
argument was that as an important member of NATO, Germany
needed to possess weapons that were just as strong as those of
its potential opponent in a conflict or the consequences would
be disastrous. They argued that it would be incomprehensible
for the Bundeswher to send its soldiers into combat without
the necessary weapons to effectively defend themselves. Both
of the ruling party rationales stressed the importance of
achieving equality for the Federal Republic in the European
security system, using nuclear armaments as the primary
instruments to accomplish this much sought after foreign
policy objective.
The opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) , on the other
hand, was strongly opposed to the deployment of any nuclear
weapons in Germany. Led by Fritz Erler, Erich Ollenhauer, and
a young Helmut Schmidt, the SPD argued against nuclear
armaments on moral grounds, considering the acceptance of
nuclear weapons as the equivalent of committing German atomic
suicide . But, even more importantly, the Social Democrats
based their argument on the contention that nuclear arms in
Germany would undermine Germany's chances for reunification
(an argument also emphasized by the Soviet Union in their
anti-nuclear rhetoric) . A four-day defense debate in the
Bundestag came to a head on March 25, 1958, when the Adenauer
coalition government prevailed in voting split solidly along
party lines. The parliamentary victory for the CDU/CSU
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coalition resulted in the passage of the so-called "March
Resolution" which states:
In accordance with the requirements of this defensive
system (the North Atlantic defense community) and in light
of the armament of the possible opponent, the armed forces
of the Federal Republic must be so equipped with the most
modern weapons that they are able to fulfil the
obligations assumed by the Federal Republic within the
NATO framework, and to make, in an effective manner, the
necessary contribution to the securing peace. (Kelleher,
1975, p. 113)
The consensus that was given to the "March Resolution" in
the Bundestag marked what might be called the official
"legitimization" of nuclear deterrence in the Federal Republic
of Germany. Whatever Bonn's doubts or specific military
interests, it had to adopt prevailing American and NATO
concepts in order to attain the U.S. strategic nuclear
guarantee . In light of the magnitude of the perceived Soviet
threat to German security, the government of Chancellor
Adenauer concluded that its choices were rather limited:
Either accept NATO doctrine and thereby gain recognition in
the West as an equal alliance partner, or fall to the mercy of
Soviet Union. Given the Federal Republic's vulnerable
position at the fulcrum between East and West, the choice was
not difficult
.
This decision would triggered an unprecedented upheaval in
German domestic politics as the SPD tried to reverse the
governments course by taking the issue to the streets. Polls
indicated that some 80 percent of the West German population
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opposed atomic missile bases of any kind on German territory .
(Schwartz, 1983, p. 72) The Social Democrats helped launch a
broad anti-nuclear campaign Kampf dem Atomtod ("Fight nuclear
Death") which "sought to rally the electorate around the
notion that nuclear weapons, in addition to being unethical,
would diminish rather than enhance West German security."
(Joffe, 1981, p. 14) To counter the anti-nuclear drive, the
Adenauer government began a public relations campaign of its
own which discredited the antinuclear campaign by equating the
goals of the SPD with those of the Soviet Union and the GDR.
(Joffe, 1981, p. 83) This crude but effective message was
successful in settling the issue in the government's favor by
the end of summer.
The Atomtod campaign effectively came to an end when the
"atomic" CDU won a majority vote in the North Rhine-Westphalia
Land elections, previously regarded as an SPD stronghold. The
electoral upset had a profound effect on the Social Democratic
party, resulting in a total reevaluation of the party's
political platform. At the following SPD party congress in
November 1959 the SPD shifted its political strategy and
effectively reconciled itself to the division of Germany,
membership in NATO, and to the American military (and nuclear)
presence in the Federal Republic in order to win political
power. (U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, 1990, p. 14) Thus, by
1960 militant domestic opposition concerning the legitimacy of
nuclear deterrence in Germany had all but ceased.
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Although initially opposed to nuclear armaments, the
Audenaur government resigned itself to the strategic reality
that in light of Soviet capabilities and intentions at the
time, nuclear weapons were the only means available with which
to deter the Soviets from seizing Berlin and continuing
through the inter-german border. An important aspect of this
decision process is that the Adenauer government was able to
pass such measures through the Bundestag although the majority
of the public disagreed with the government's position. This
phenomenon has been explained by the wide gulf that separated
the individual german from his government in the early postwar
years. Today, however, successor generations are much more
active in democratic government and would never allow a
similar situation to occur.
B. THE "EUROSTRATEGIC" NUCLEAR BALANCE
If one were to give a date for the rebirth of the public
debate on nuclear deterrence in NATO it would have to be May
10, 1977, the day of the NATO Summit meeting in London. It was
at this that meeting West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
informed the other alliance heads of state that, in his view,
NATO strategy was about to enter a new phase of reduced
reliance on strategic nuclear forces. His remarks illuminated
a growing crisis of confidence among NATO's European allies in
the credibility of the American strategic nuclear guarantee
since President Jimmy Carter entered the White House in
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January with a commitment to radically reduce nuclear weapons
(exemplified by his call for complete nuclear disarmament in
his inaugural address)
.
Chancellor Schmidt's remarks outlined two previous phases
in alliance strategy over the past twenty years. The first
phase, he described as being in the late 1950s and 1960s when
emphasis was "placed on deterrence rather than defence, ..."
Moreover, he explained that the credibility of this nuclear
deterrence arrangement was possible only because of Western
nuclear superiority at a time of inferiority in conventional
forces. (Schmidt, 1977, p. 177) During this initial phase of
alliance strategy, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increased,
it became apparent that allied confidence in the U.S. nuclear
guarantee was in decline. This was demonstrated most clearly
by British and French efforts to develop independent national
nuclear strength. The West German government, however, having
been sworn against the development of any kind of national
nuclear capability, instead became increasingly dependent on
the American extended nuclear guarantee. An abortive attempt
in the early 1960s to increase German access and control of
nuclear weapons by establishing a NATO multilateral nuclear
force (MLF) , succeeded only in drawing added attention to
Germany's special vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, in 1968, as
a consolation of sorts for the collapse of the MLF project,
NATO instituted the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) giving West
Germany a more influential role in NATO's nuclear planning and
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decision making process. This measure, combined with the
French decision to withdraw from the integrated alliance
structure in 1966, elevated the position and status of the
Federal Republic in the Atlantic Alliance, making Germany the
most important continental European ally of the United States.
For Germany this more prominent role in the alliance helped to
ease German concerns about the reliability of its nuclear
deterrence arrangements with the U.S. in NATO, at least
temporarily.
Changes in the alliance structure following the withdrawal
of France in 1967 also led to changes in alliance strategy.
NATO adopted the doctrine of "Flexible Response" in 1967,
beginning what Chancellor Schmidt declared as a second phase
in alliance strategy. Schmidt called 'flexible response' a
"strategy of both deterrence and defense," based on a
combination of first, strategic nuclear forces; second, the
so-called tactical nuclear forces; and third, conventional
military forces. (Schmidt, 1977, p. 178) The new NATO strategic
doctrine sought to deter aggression across the spectrum of
armed conflict through the maintenance of an appropriate mix
of both conventional and nuclear forces. The new strategy was
designed to give NATO leaders a range of options below the
level of massive U.S. strategic nuclear strikes. These options
were believed to strengthen deterrence because they would
provide an unbroken chain from theater nuclear war to
strategic nuclear war. (Thomson, 1984, p. 602) Schmidt argued
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extensively as both an SPD party spokesman in the early 1960s
and later as defense minister for Willy Brandt, for an
increase in NATO's conventional defense posture, opposing any
massive nuclear response to conventional Warsaw Pact
aggression . 2
Schmidt continued with his remarks by predicting that NATO
would soon be entering a third phase in the continual
evolution of its strategy, a phase that would place greater
emphasis on the third component of the "flexible response"
triad, conventional military forces. The Soviet build-up of
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities between
1967 and 1977 had undeniably created a certain "parity,
"
otherwise called "essential equivalence, " of strategic nuclear
forces between the Soviet Union and the United States. To
Schmidt, this transformation of the strategic balance, once
stabilized in the form of a SALT II agreement, would make it
necessary to "reduce the political and military role of
strategic nuclear weapons as a normal component of [NATO]
defense and deterrence." (Schmidt, 1977, p. 178) Schmidt
explained the rationale behind his supposition was that "the
strategic nuclear component will become increasingly regarded
as an instrument of last resort, to serve the national
interest and protect the survival of those who possess these
weapons of last resort." (Schmidt, 1977, p. 178) [Emphasis
1 See Schmidt, Helmut. Defense or Retaliation: A German
View, Praeger, 1962.
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added] It was feared the Federal Republic would be excluded
from such an arrangement because it did not possess these
instruments of "last resort" and by implication the future
reliability and credibility of extended deterrence
arrangements with the United States under new conditions of
superpower nuclear parity were in doubt. In this phase the
legitimacy of nuclear deterrence was severely weakened.
Exacerbating the strategic dilemma posed by "parity" was
the Soviet deployment of newly developed SS-2 "Saber" (Soviet
designation RSD-10 Pioner) mobile intermediate-range ballistic
missiles in the Spring of 1977 to complement their modern
medium-range "Backfire" bombers that had begun deployments two
years prior. The Soviet SS-20 missile represented a tremendous
advance in long-range theater nuclear force modernization for
several reasons. First, because it was mobile and therefore
almost invulnerable; second, the transporter erector-launchers
could be easily reloaded; third, each missile could deliver
three independently targetable nuclear warheads with a high
degree of accuracy; and fourth, it had a range estimated to be
as high as 3000 nautical miles (5,000km). The TU-26/TU-22M
"Backfire" bomber, first introduced in 1975, had a greater
range, 2100 nautical miles (approx. 4,000km), than either of
its predecessors the TU-16 "Badger" and the TU-22 "Blinder,
"
plus it could fly at high subsonic speeds (Mach 0.9) at low
altitudes, increasing its survivability and ability to
penetrate NATO air defenses under combat conditions. These
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capabilities gave the Soviets serious improvements in the
employment flexibility of their nuclear forces and put them in
a position to counter NATO's nuclear employment options at
every level of conflict. (Thomson, 1984, p. 602)
The Backfire bomber was thought by a majority of U.S.
intelligence analysts to be capable of performing
intercontinental strategic bombing missions if refueled in-
flight. Therefore, some American arms control advocates wanted
the Backfire to be limited under SALT II. The Soviet Union on
the other hand, wanted to place constraints on U.S. cruise
missile programs, including a ban on long-range ground and
sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) it considered
strategic weapons. (Thomson, 1984, p. 603) Both Americans and
Europeans in the defense establishment extolled the merits of
this new generation of high technology cruise missiles as a
way to improve NATO's flexible response capability,
substituting cruise missiles for tactical air forces in
theater nuclear strike roles. 1 Reassurances by the Soviet
Union that the Backfire would only be deployed against Western
Europe in exchange for American promises to limit cruise
missile deployments made many Europeans fear that the United
States was suggesting to the Soviets, without meaning to do
so, that American and European security could be decoupled.
1 For a full discussion of the subject see Hoist, Johan
J., and Uwe Nerlich, eds . Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Aims,
New Arms, (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977) .
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Chancellor Schmidt became more worried that as a result of
strategic nuclear parity between the two superpowers in
combination with the growing number of Soviet theater nuclear
forces, or as he preferred to call them, "Eurostrategic"
nuclear weapons, the Soviets would use these weapons as
instruments of "political blackmail against Germany." (Herf,
1990, p. 54) According to Schmidt, President Gerald Ford had
understood and shared his concern about the deployment of the
new Soviet theater nuclear systems and specifically promised
that the SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber would be included
within the framework of SALT II. (Schmidt, 198
,
p. 170) In a
July 1977 meeting at the White House with President Carter and
national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chancellor
Schmidt personally expressed these same concerns with the new
American president, seeking similar assurances they would be
included in a SALT II treaty. Schmidt recalls in his
autobiographical work Men and Powers, that he was certain
"Carter had given no thought to including the Eurostrategic
SS-20 intermediate-range missiles and the Backfire bomber . . .
in the limitation of strategic weapons he had in mind."
(Schmidt, 1989, p. 184) In general, Washington's response to
the German statesman was a reminder that American strategic
nuclear forces provided ample target coverage of the Western
USSR and for that reason the alliance had long foregone the
capability to strike Soviet territory from the European
continent. U.S. Thor and Jupiter IRBMs and MRBMs had been
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removed from Italy and Turkey by 1964 following the Cuban
missile crisis. (Thomson, 1984, p. 603) This argument, in
effect ignored Schmidt's concern about the effects of
strategic nuclear parity weakening extended deterrence and
left the Chancellor thinking the administration was only
interested in reducing the strategic threat to American
territory without being bothered by European security
interests. (Schmidt, 1989, p. 185)
As a result, German-American relations grew even farther
apart throughout the summer months, significantly strained by
the "neutron bomb" debate that had begun in July to be
followed with a press leak in early August that reported the
White House to be considering a possible modification of
NATO's forward defense strategy in its most recent national
security reassessment, Presidential Review Memorandum 10 (PRM-
10) .
First, the enhanced radiation warhead, or "neutron bomb"
as it became known in public debates, intensified prompt
nuclear radiation energy in the form of neutrons more than ten
times that of previous tactical nuclear weapons. This
radiation emphasis made it possible, by bursting ER weapons at
sufficient altitude, to incapacitate military personnel
without the attendant destructive physical effects of blast
and heat reaching the surface. (Yost, 1982, p. 529)
Opponents argued that the neutron bomb was immoral
because it would 'kill people but spare buildings'. In July
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1977, Egon Bahr, secretary general of the Social Democratic
party and architect of Willy Brandt's Ostpolotik called the
neutron bomb a "symbol of the perversion of thought." (Herf,
1990, p. 61) Proponents of the weapon countered that it was no
more immoral than any other horrible weapon of war, either
conventional or nuclear, in the NATO arsenal; but that the
damage limitation capability of this weapon would help limit
escalation and thereby strengthen the credibility of "flexible
response." Manfred Worner, then a leading CDU defense expert
in parliament said, "Precisely because this weapon reduces
collateral damage for the civilian population, its use is more
credible, the risk is higher and thus deterrence and war
prevention is more effective." (Herf, 1990, p. 61)
Chancellor Schmidt was given little room to maneuver on
the issue since the majority in his own ruling Social
Democratic Party shared Egon Bahr's moral revulsion of the
weapon, yet he was reluctant to force a direct confrontation
with the new American leadership over this issue. If the
Americans and NATO insisted on deploying the neutron bomb in
West Germany, then Schmidt would go along. But, for obvious
domestic political reasons "he was in no position to petition
these weapons." (Schwartz, 1983, p. 209) Yet, for domestic
political reasons of his own, this is precisely the
"condition" President Carter required for a positive U.S.
production decision.
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Meanwhile, on August 3, 1977 the Washington Post reported
that a recently completed interagency review of U.S. defense
policy, PRM-10, advocated NATO consider the Weser-Lech line as
its main line of defense. This would in effect concede about
one third of West German territory in the event of Warsaw Pact
aggression, in contrast to NATO's longtime strategy of
"forward defense," the cornerstone of West German defense
policy. (Schwartz, 1983, p. 213) The Carter administration
vehemently denied the reports, claiming the line had been
mentioned notionally as a method for calculating NATO defense
planning requirements, however, the incident illustrated the
Carter administrations complete lack of sensitivity about
European security interests, issues and requirements, a fact
that infuriated European leaders, none more so than Schmidt.
Chancellor Schmidt reacted to Washington's insensitivity
by going public with his worries in a speech before the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London
on October 28, 1977. In his speech, Schmidt made a more
explicit argument for including Eurostrategic systems in
superpower negotiations:
Changed strategic conditions confront us with new
problems. SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance
between the Soviet Union and the United States . To put it
another way: SALT neutralizes their strategic
capabilities . In Europe this magnifies the significance of
the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical
and conventional weapons. (Schmidt, 1977, p. 3) [Emphasis
added]
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The Soviet Union had deployed medium-range SS-4 and SS-5
nuclear missiles along with numerous Badger and Bison medium-
range bombers since the mid-1950s that were directed at
Western Europe. Therefore, it wasn't the fact that the Soviets
were deploying new missiles and bombers that upset Schmidt, it
was the political leverage these forces might provide the
Soviets in light of the "neutralization" of American strategic
nuclear forces . If the United States would be in any way
deterred from coming to Western Europe's defense by the growth
of Soviet intercontinental nuclear weapons--as it was thought
they might be--then the relative pressure and threat emanating
from Soviet medium-range weapons directed at Western Europe
would increase dramatically. As author Jeffrey Herf has
pointed out, "This was the meaning of 'decoupling', the
nightmare of NATO strategists," and even more so the Federal
Republic of Germany. (Herf, 1990, p. 55)
In light of. his failed attempts to impress his point with
the American President, Schmidt added new emphasis in his IISS
speech to the importance of maintaining the military balance
along the full spectrum of deterrence.
Strategic arms limitations confined to the United States
and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security
of the West European members of the Alliance vis-a-vis
Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed
in removing the disparities of military power in Europe in
parallel to the SALT negotiations. So long as this is not
the case we must maintain the balance of the full range of
deterrence strategy. The Alliance must, therefore, be
ready to make available the means to support it present
strategy, . . . (Schmidt, 1977, p. 4)
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It was only by going public with his argument that Schmidt
was able to convince Washington that non-strategic nuclear
weapons possess as much political value to Europeans in
general and Germans in particular, as strategic nuclear
weapons have for the United States and the Soviet Union . The
Chancellor's pronouncements quickly gathered support in Europe
and within six months NATO had established a High Level Group
(HLG) under the auspices of the NPG to study the problems
highlighted by Schmidt.
A Eurostrategic balance could be accomplished in either of
two ways: One would be for the Soviet Union to withdraw its
theater nuclear forces already deployed; the other would be
for the Western alliance to build-up its theater nuclear
capability to counter the Soviet threat. Naturally, Schmidt
preferred the first option, but could not realistically expect
the Soviets to surrender their military advantage through a
unilateral force reduction without of course some incentive to
do so from the West. Schmidt's implicit request for the
deployment of NATO long-range theater nuclear forces to
restore the "Eurostrategic" military balance "was the
essential prerequisite for sustaining the European political
balance and retaining an important German voice in the
management of the Western alliance." (Hanrieder, 1989, p. 112)
In April 1979 the HLG submitted its final report to the
NPG with the following recommendations:
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• NATO should modernize its LRTNF through an evolutionary
upward adjustment.
• The deployment package should consist of land-based cruise
missiles and ballistic missiles. (A SLCM option was
considered but decided against because of limited
visibility of sea-based systems).
• The total number of missiles deployed should be greater
than 200, in order to have a substantial effect, but less
than 600, so that the possibility of decoupling would not
be too great
.
• Deployment should be shared among as many NATO allies as
possible
.
• A final decision on LRTNF should be made before December
1979 to avoid complications that might arise during West
German elections in 1980. (Schwartz, 1983, p. 227)
On 12 December 1979 the NATO council of foreign and
defense ministers in Brussels announced the "two-track"
decision to deploy 572 medium-range nuclear weapons (108
Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise
missiles) and simultaneously to offer to begin arms control
negotiations with the Soviet Union "as soon as possible."
Along with the deployment decision, NATO announced the
withdrawal of 1000 tactical nuclear warheads from Western
Europe, to avoid the impression that NATO was "packing"
Central Europe with more nuclear arms
.
The December 1979 NATO decision was a short-lived victory
for Chancellor Schmidt as later that same month the U.S.
Senate Committee on Armed Services rejected the SALT II Treaty
recommending major changes and the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan. The combination of these two events put to a halt
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the arms control track of the "two-track" approach.
Additionally, in August 1980, the Carter administration
published Presidential Directive - 59 (PD-59), also known as
the countervailing strategy. The countervailing strategy was
designed to provide the National Command Authority with
selective and measured nuclear options to a less than all-out
Soviet attack utilizing whatever level of response was deemed
appropriate for the aggression taken.
The cumulative effect of these occurrences was a
fundamental reinterpretation of NATO's 1979 decision. Rather
than being the result of West German concerns, it became the
product of American pressure. (Herf, 1990, p. 119) Rather than
couple the United States to Western Europe more firmly, the
decision was labelled as an attempt by American "warf ighters
"
to limit nuclear war to Europe and the Soviet Union.
This incredible reinterpretation of the NATO "dual-track"
decision brought renewed spirit into the European peace/anti-
nuclear movement which began to vigorously protest against the
NATO missile deployments. Within his own SPD Party, Schmidt
received enormous pressure to reverse his support for the NATO
decision. In order to quiet the growing opposition Chancellor
Schmidt and foreign minister Genscher urged the United States
to adopt a "zero option" as the goal of the INF negotiations.
(Herf, 190, p. 135) President Reagan offered the Soviets this
so-called "double-zero" option publicly in November 1981 with
the strong belief that the USSR would never accept a zero
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level, thereby giving the U.S. president a "magnificent
political ploy." (Rogers, 1988, p. 114)
On 22 November 1983 a final resolution supporting the
deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM missiles passed in the
Bundestag. Almost exactly as had been the case 25 years
earlier for the vote on initial deployments, the voting was
split solidly along Party lines. The following week, the first
Pershing II missiles arrived in Germany and the Soviet
Delegation walked out on INF negotiations in Geneva the
following day.
Following the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, however,
West European leaders were faced with the surprising
possibility that General Secretary Gorbachev was willing to
accept the zero-level proposal. It was only then that they
realized they had been painted into a political corner, unable
to explain to their publics that the zero-option was actually
not in their best interests without losing their political
credibility. General Bernard Rogers exclaimed: "It was at that
point that political credibility and expediency took priority
over the credibility of NATO's deterrence." (Rogers, 1988,
p. 115)
The INF Treaty was signed by President Ronald Reagan and
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on December 7, 1987 and
ratified by the United States Senate on May 27, 1988. The
treaty directed the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet
intermediate-range land-based missile delivery systems. For
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the Soviet Union this meant the elimination of all SS-4, SS-
12/22, SS-23, and SS-20 ballistic missiles and the SSC-X-4
cruise missile. On the U.S. side, the treaty bans all ground-
launched cruise missiles (GLCM's) and the Pershing II
intermediate range ballistic missile. In addition, outside the
framework of the INF Treaty, West Germany has unilaterally
agreed to dismantle its 72 shorter range Pershing IA's. The
INF Treaty does not however, apply to sea-launched or air-
launched cruise missiles (SLCM's or ALCM's), to dual-capable
aircraft (DCA) or to short-range nuclear forces. Nor does it
apply to British or French nuclear forces. (Bitzinger, 1989,
p. 7)
Strategically, it is believed by many that the INF Treaty
seriously crippled the Atlantic Alliance's capacity for
flexible response along a "continuum of deterrence" necessary
to counter the Soviet arsenal of diverse weaponry.
(Kirkpatrick, 1988, p. 72) At a March 1988 conference of U.S.
and West European defense analysts and government officials,
several European participants expressed the belief that, "By
removing an important and hitherto weak link in NATO's chain
of nuclear forces, the treaty took a few rungs out of the
West's "ladder of escalation." It also raised anew the old
debate over "decoupling" - that is, over breaking the link
between a war in Europe and U.S. strategic nuclear forces."
(Bitzinger, 1989, p. 7)
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From a European perspective, the elimination of
intermediate-range nuclear missiles greatly reduces NATO's
ability to conduct a deep strike onto Soviet soil fulfilling
the need to punish Soviet aggression; however, from the
American perspective, the elimination of LRINF missiles
significantly lowers the threshold of strategic nuclear
escalation, thus endangering the U.S. homeland.
General Bernard Rogers expressed further concern that the
Treaty "puts Western Europe on the slippery slope of
denuclearization, something the Soviets have wanted ever since
the United States began to deploy nuclear weapons in Western
Europe. It makes Europe safe for conventional war ." (Rogers,
1988, p. 104)
General Rogers' comments may at first appear overly
dramatic. However, the political momentum has certainly
shifted in the direction of denuclearization since the time of
his testimony. Fueled by Soviet unilateral force reductions
in Eastern Europe, and a Soviet call for a global ban on all
weapons of mass destruction (both nuclear and chemical) , there
has indeed been further "slippage." Some European analysts
believe that the whole INF process has left an indelible mark
on West European politics. As Richard Bitzinger has observed
during a recent conference discussing NATO strategy for the
1990 's, "In the opinion of one European at the conference, it
has unleashed a "political maelstrom" within the Federal
Republic over the future of nuclear forces there." (Bitzinger,
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1989, p. 7) Recent statements by the German Social Democratic
Party (SPD) support this observation. An SPD statement
released in March 1990 called for the elimination of the
concept of atomic deterrence and the removal of all atomic and
chemical weapons from German soil. (Wieczorek, 1990, p.l)
General John Galvin, SACEUR, recently wrote:
The deterrent value of theater-based nuclear systems rests
on the willingness of all nations of the alliance to
support the nuclear aspects of the strategy of flexible
response. It is important that all of these [NATO]
countries, not just a small number, agree on modernization
of the nuclear deterrent. This must be an alliance
decision whose costs - both economic and political - are
shared by all. (Galvin, 1989, p. 91)
Richard Bitzinger of the RAND corporation points out that: "It
would not be easy to go to the people of Western Europe and
the United States and argue that, after signing a popular arms
control treaty, NATO must now procure new forces that appear,
in effect, to circumvent the spirit of that treaty."
(Bitzinger, 1989, p. 21)
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III. REFORMULATING NATO STRATEGY
A. BACKGROUND: "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE"
The NATO Doctrine of "Flexible Response" was adopted by
the Defense Planning Committee in ministerial session in March
1967, and is contained in Military Committee document 14/3,
the "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO
Area." (Sinnreich, 1975, p. 461) With the exception of France,
all military members base their common defense on this
strategy. As Michael Legge describes it, "The strategy set out
in MC 14/3 seeks to deter aggression by the maintenance of
conventional, theatre nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces
that would enable the Alliance to respond to any attack at an
appropriate level." (Legge, 1983, p. 9) NATO's initial response
would be direct defense, seeking to defeat the assault on the
level at which the enemy had chosen to fight. Legge further
adds, "If the aggression could not be contained, the Alliance
would be prepared to conduct a deliberate escalation, raising
but where possible controlling the scope and intensity of
combat, with the aim of making the cost and risk
disproportionate to the aggressor's objectives and the threat
of nuclear response more imminent." (Legge, 1983, p. 9) The
ultimate objective, if should deterrence fail, would be to
convince the aggressor of the unacceptable degree of risk
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involved, thus causing him to cease his attack and withdraw.
Finally, in the event of a major nuclear attack, NATO would
preserve a capability for a massive strategic nuclear
response. (Legge, 1983, p. 9)
Flexible response replaced what most believed to be an
incredible strategy of "massive retaliation, " which relied
almost exclusively on the threat of U.S. strategic nuclear
retaliation, to deter any but the most limited threats to the
Atlantic Alliance. (Sinnreich, 1975, p. 462) The doctrine of
"massive retaliation" lost most of its credibility as a
deterrent with improvements in Soviet strategic capabilities
throughout the 1960 's, thereby placing a larger threat of
Soviet response in kind on U.S. cities. European leaders soon
began to doubt the willingness of American leaders to risk
attacks on American cities for their own as a consequence of
Soviet aggression in Europe.
1. Hierarchy of Potential Levels of Deterrence
"Flexible response" was developed to eliminate the gap
between conventional war and 'spasm' nuclear retaliation by
deliberate but controlled escalation through a range of
possible intermediate levels of potential violence as
required. Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense (1967
- 1969), has classified ten suggested levels of potential








relationships between conventional, theater nuclear, and





Theater nuclear war in which intermediate
gray area weapons, such as the SS-20,
Backfire, G-Forces class submarine, FB-111,
intermediate range cruise missiles, and the
like are used.
4. Forward Edge of the Battlefield (FEBA)
nuclear war with both sides primarily using
shorter range weapons close to the line of
contact between opposing forces; neither
superpower using its intercontinental or gray
area weapons, and both superpowers avoiding
the territory of the other.
5. Unilateral use by the country attacked of
tactical nuclear weapons in self defense on
and over its own territory.




Conventional war with only a single
superpower actively participating.
8. Conventional war with the client states only
participating.
9. Civil war or guerilla war in its various
forms
.
10. Political, economic, and psychological
warfare. (Nitze, 1977, p. 122)
The Atlantic Alliance recognized and was willing to
accept the possibility that failure to contain enemy
aggression on the conventional level would result in
deliberate escalation of war to a nuclear level, and that once
that level had been reached, that it would be very difficult
to control further escalation. Both Europeans and Americans
accepted these risks, but for contradictory and somewhat
selfish reasons. The Europeans did so because they believed
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that "the threat to use theater nuclear weapons (TNW)
represented the best way of "coupling" the U.S. strategic
deterrent to the defense of Europe, and the Americans because
it offered "the best hope of preventing a major land battle in
Europe from escalating to an all-out strategic exchange."
(Legge, 1983, p. 10) Both sides of the Atlantic, therefore,
perceived advantages to be gained through acceptance of the
new doctrine. Richard Sinnreich notes that, "More important,
however, adoption was achieved by framing the doctrine in
terms sufficiently ambiguous to enable all participants to
interpret it as they please." (Sinnreich, 1975, p. 463) Over
the years this ambiguity has served alliance cohesion well
while also adding a measure of uncertainty to any opponents
calculations as to the exact nature and scale of a response.
B. THE DETERRENCE DEBATE WITHIN NATO
Once the doctrine of "Flexible Response" had been adopted
by the Atlantic Alliance, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)
,
established in April 1967 to give non-nuclear Allies a
consultative role in decisions over the use of nuclear
weapons, was charged with the responsibility of developing
political guidelines for the use of Theater Nuclear Weapons
(TNW) . Individual member countries, without direct involvement
of the United States, were requested to work through in detail
the possible implications of NATO first use of nuclear weapons
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at theater level, since that was the prescribed action to be
taken in accordance with the strategy.
The results of this work produced an Anglo-German paper,
often referred to as the Healey-Schroeder report. The report,
presented to and later approved by the NPG (after several
amendments), was well received by the Allies. Michael Legge
recounts that the most important reservations came from the
Americans concerning the scale of first use:
The Americans were anxious not to rule out as a possible
option the initial use of theatre weapons on a substantial
scale, perhaps running into hundreds of weapons. (This was
a point on which the Germans in particular were
understandably sensitive, given the possibility that many
of the weapons might be used on German territory.) But
this was the only significant manifestation of the views
of adherents to the so-called "warf ighting" school of
thought - those who argue that once NATO has been driven
to the point of using nuclear weapons (and bearing in mind
Soviet declaratory policy, which calls for large-scale
nuclear response to any NATO use of nuclear weapons) , then
the primary objective of such use should be to gain an
immediate military victory, at least at the local level.
. . . In the case of the initial use guidelines, however,
despite reservations about the possible scale of use, the
U.S. came down firmly in support of the view taken by the
Europeans that NATO's objective would be essentially
political and that initial use would therefore be very
selective. (Legge, 1983, p. 20)
The nuclear guidelines approved by the NPG could readily
accommodate either view, "warf ighters " or those who believed
in the primacy of the "political signal", simply because of
the ambiguity inherent in the doctrine of flexible response
itself. At the heart of the debate over flexible response in
general, lay a fundamental disagreement between the United
States and its Allies regarding both the nature of deterrence,
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and how its risks should be apportioned. (Sinnreich, 1975,
p. 463) The American "warf ighters " in emphasizing the flexible
nature of flexible response sought deterrence through an
ability to ensure the 'denial' of enemy objectives. They
advocated placing greater emphasis on denying territorial
objectives to the enemy, by escalation to battlefield/tactical
nuclear weapons equivalent to level five in the hierarchy of
potential violence/deterrence. The European interpretation of
the strategy aligns itself more closely with "deterrence by
punishment", which places a greater emphasis on the threat of
escalatory use of theater nuclear weapons to strike the enemy
beyond the battlefield, preferably on his homeland, and
thereby inflict extreme punishment on his assets. This
interpretation places first-use at the equivalent to level
three in the hierarchy outlined by Nitze in 1977.
Central to this debate is the question of the threshold at
which NATO might make the choice to turn to nuclear weapons in
order to avoid defeat at the conventional level. Clearly, the
Americans would prefer a higher threshold, in order to reduce
the risk of escalation to intercontinental nuclear war between
the superpowers; while Europeans would prefer to lower the
threshold, thus raising the stakes of any Soviet aggression.
It has been argued that the credibility of the U.S. strategic
guarantee is directly related to the level at which the
nuclear threshold is set. The lower the nuclear threshold is
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set, the lower the credibility of the U.S. commitment to use
strategic nuclear weapons, and vice versa.
Robert Levine classifies the European and American
differences by separating them into two major categories,
"European Couplers and American Maintainers . " He asserts "The
West Europeans want a strategy that will maintain the
credibility of the link between any potential conventional war
on their continent and the American nuclear weapons that are
counted on to deter its outbreak in the first place. The
constraint is that the link to American nuclear forces cannot
be so automatic as to scare Americans away from the initial
engagement. The Americans want a strategy that will avoid
invoking nuclear weapons. The constraint is that this must be
done without breaking the link completely, so that the nuclear
deterrent to Soviet aggression will remain credible enough to
do its job." (Levine, 1988, p. 56)
A criticism of the flexible response strategy has been
that it was credible in a period of U.S. strategic nuclear
weapons superiority, but that since the mid 1970 's, when the
Soviets achieved parity in strategic nuclear forces, the risks
of escalation dominance by the Soviet Union have weakened its
basic deterrent credibility. Dr. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of
State for Presidents Nixon and Ford, spoke rather frankly of
the European-American relationship in a 1979 NATO conference
address in Brussels -
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Let us face it: the intellectually predominant position
in the United States was that we had to retain full
control of the conduct of nuclear war and we therefore had
a vested interest in avoiding any "firebreak" between
tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons.
The very reasoning that operated against setting a
rational purpose for strategic forces also operated
against giving a military role to tactical nuclear forces.
And this was compounded by the fact that - to be tactless
- the secret dream of every European was, of course, to
avoid nuclear war but, secondly, if there had to be a
nuclear war, to have it conducted over their heads by the
strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet
Union. (Kissinger, 1979, p. 8)
In short, the European interpretation of the flexible
response strategy centers around self-preservation and
protection from the devastation of modern conventional war as
well as nuclear holocaust; Americans feel threatened by the
potential escalation of nuclear warfare to their homeland.
This means that for Europeans the strength of the American
commitment is largely a political issue focused on the
American willingness to honor its nuclear guarantee. The
Americans, on the other hand, perceive flexible response as a
military issue centered about the "threshold" level at which
theater nuclear weapons will have to be used to avoid
conventional defeat
.
C. MAJOR POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES
Three primary factors - Political, Geopolitical, and
Military - determine the character and composition of NATO's
deterrent strategy. It is the relationship between these
factors which distinguishes one strategy from another. All
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three factors are important in the development of a strategy,
however, political factors tend to outweigh other elements of
the tripartite because political actions drive government
leaders to adopt policies that make deterrent strategies
plausible or implausible. Therefore, in order to help judge
the direction with which the Atlantic Alliance is most likely
to proceed with respect to future strategy options, special
emphasis must be given to the examination of military-
political issues most active in alliance discussions.
Political issues that are generally debated in the public
regarding NATO's nuclear strategy are: arms control
objectives, basing of nuclear weapons, coupling mechanisms for
the US nuclear guarantee, the credibility of extended
deterrence, the probability of escalation from conventional
war in a crisis (threshold) , and the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. These issues are all closely interrelated, therefore
it is difficult to discuss any one of these issues without
crossing into another, however, an attempt will be made to
address each individually. Specific military issues often do
not enter the public debate however, recent strategic changes
make it import to at least touch on the subject of targeting
changes
.
1 . Arms Control
Arms control is an issue which is developing rapidly
as a result of perestroika in the Soviet Union. Mentioned
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previously were several arms control proposals and agreements
that are currently being discussed. The START-1 treaty
reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers
by nearly 50 percent has now been signed. Soviet leaders have
come to realize that arms reductions are a much more effective
method of reducing US influence in Europe than any 'Cold War'
propaganda or show of force could have hoped to be.
Soviet literature now openly espouses the benefits of
minimum deterrence with some civilian authors suggesting that
the USSR could reduce the size of its nuclear forces to 500
warheads and still be able to maintain "minimum deterrence." 1
(Dvorkin, 1989, p. 105) If the US were to agree to such
drastically reduced levels it would be nearly impossible to
maintain a credible extended deterrent without some sort of a
major technological breakthrough. Instead, or until such a
breakthrough, minimum levels should be negotiated that will
allow for a credible extended deterrent to flourish.
Alexei Arbatov of the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO), warns that "After the 50
percent reductions of strategic offensive weapons and after
the elimination of medium-range and shorter range missiles in
Europe, the time will very soon come when it will be
1 Colonel Vladamir Dvorkin and Colonel Valeriy Torbin,
"On Real Sufficiency of Defense, Military Specialists' Point
of View, " on MOSCOW NEWS in English, 25 June 1989, reported in
"Officials View 'Adequate Defense Sufficiency' , FBIS: Soviet
Union
, (3 July 1989), 105.
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impossible to proceed further without the participation of the
other nuclear powers. 1 (Arbatov, 1990, p. 42) The European
nuclear powers may balk at such a proposal, believing they
already maintain sufficiently low levels of forces that they
are not a threat to other nations. Soviet insistence to
include the European nuclear powers in superpower negotiations
may collapse the entire process and allow the US and USSR to
maintain superior strategic arsenals. This would stop the
evolutionary process in a muted bipolar system, and favor the
adoption of 'Resolute Deterrence'.
2. Coupling
Another issue closely linked to the question of
weapons deployments is that of a 'coupling mechanism', or
device used to link the US strategic nuclear systems with the
security of the European continent. It is felt by many that if
US interests are not on-the-line there would be little
incentive for the US to take action in the event of a crisis.
Long-range theater nuclear forces provided the most credible
coupling mechanism for the alliance, however, those missiles
are now gone.
Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in an
interview shortly after the 1990 NATO London Summit, made it
1 Alexei Arbatov, "Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence: In
Search of a New Basis for European Security, " in Rethinking
European Security , Furio Cerutti and Rodolfo Ragionieri, eds . ,
(New York: Crane Russak, 1990), 42.
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clear that she believed two things are fundamental to NATO
strategy: "American forces on German soil accompanied by
American nuclear weapons . " (Thatcher, 1990, p.l) Although many
would agree with Mrs. Thatcher on keeping American forces in
Europe, the opposite may be said concerning nuclear weapons.
The official line has generally been that nuclear forces
played the coupling role, but according to retired U.S. Army
General William D. Odom, "in reality it has always been the
presence of U.S. ground forces in Central Europe... that have
served as the most credible guarantee, especially in the eyes
of the European publics and in the eyes of the Soviet
leadership." (Odom, 1990, p. 215)
A further coupling device that is less often mentioned
is NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) . It ensures non-nuclear
Alliance partners participation in the formulation of Allied
nuclear policy.
3. Credibility
George Thibault describes four methods of increasing
the credibility of an extended deterrent:
1. Identify the protected state as if it were the '51st'
state
2. Fail to prepare for conventional war (French approach)
3. Use American forces as a 'tripwire'
4. Deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the path of possible
aggressors. (Thibault, 1986, pp. 85-89)
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If this prescription is correct, than it may be
deduced that indeed the removal of American nuclear weapons
and forces from Germany and the other European allies would
weaken the credibility of the US guarantee. Geopolitical
factors such as increased economic and political autonomy for
Western Europe also contribute to a weakening of the trans-
Atlantic link. This predicament has caused some to argue that
the time is ripe for a NATO Multinational Force with US
participation. (Young, 1990, p.l) US participation in such a
force would provide a 'coupling mechanism' , anchoring American
forces in Europe and thereby reinforcing the credibility of
the extended deterrent.
The development of a NATO Multinational Force with US
participation would be an important factor in stabilizing the
evolution of Alliance strategy at this phase, and
strengthening the credibility of the US extended deterrent. If
no coupling mechanisms are maintained in Europe, this would
likewise be an indicator that NATO may be continuing toward a
'Minimum Deterrent' strategy.
4 . Threshold
An issue of tremendous debate within the alliance and
rekindled by the July 19 9 NATO Summit is the question
relating to the escalation of conflict from conventional to
nuclear war, often referred to as the "threshold" argument.
The London Declaration stated that due to the political and
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military changes in Europe, the allies would be able to adopt
a "new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of
last resort." (NATO Review, 1990, p. 32) Both British Prime
Minister Thatcher and French President Francois Mitterrand
expressed concern at the Summit meeting over this proposal by
President Bush.
The Washington Post reported that Mrs. Thatcher
complained in a letter to President Bush that this phrase
could undermine NATO's deliberately ambiguous strategy of
"flexible response" to any Soviet aggression. The British
leader suggested alternative wording in which nuclear
armaments would be described as "weapons of war prevention"
[emphasizing deterrence] rather than of "last resort." (Smith,
1990, p. 23) The final Summit communique contained the phrase
"there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in
response to military action might be discounted" (NATO, 1990,
p. 33) to the satisfaction of the British delegation. Since the
adoption by NATO in 1967 of the "flexible response" strategy,
NATO has purposely held out the possibility that it would use
its nuclear weapons to halt an aggressor during any phase of
a conflict
.
The wording of this phrase may be interpreted by some
as raising the nuclear threshold, thereby reducing NATO's
commitment to use nuclear weapons at any phase. British and
many American NATO supporters believe this ambiguity adds a
measure of uncertainty into any opponents calculations thereby
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increasing its deterrent stock. The "last resort" strategy
element may even be loosely interpreted by some as being
synonymous with a "no first-use" policy. Although this was
certainly not the intent of American leaders, it seems to have
become a de facto elevation of the nuclear threshold. The
British reaction to the wording change illustrates Britains'
desire to maintain the status quo for NATO and take a more
cautious, measured approach toward developments in Central
Europe
.
Immediately prior to the July Summit there was
optimistic speculation by some alliance observers that the new
NATO strategy adjustments may bring France back into the fold.
Francois de Rose, former French Ambassador to NATO, understood
from initial reports that the "last resort" concept was
remarkably similar to the French strategy of a "final
warning", (de Rose, 1990, p. 3) Nevertheless, as it turned out,
French President Mitterrand did not read the shift in policy
the same way, becoming quite miffed at the other NATO allies
and disassociating himself from the London Declaration upon
his return to Paris. French Defense Minister Chevenement
declared that the two doctrines - NATO and French - were
"diametrically opposed." (Chevenement, 1990, p. 19)
French deterrent strategy declares that a "final
warning" nuclear strike using sub-strategic nuclear systems
will be launched early-on in a military aggression against
French national security interests. If this measure fails to
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halt the aggressor it is to be followed by swift and sure
massive retaliation by French strategic nuclear systems. The
French interpretation of NATO's declaration that nuclear
weapons are truly weapons of "last resort" is that it permits
an extended period of conventional war, before nuclear
armaments would be used. President Mitterrand proclaimed his
opposition to the NATO strategy commenting "that deterrence
was designed to prevent war, to stop it from happening, no to
win it." 1 (Mitterrand, 1990, p. 11)
1 Francois Mitterrand, "Logically the French Army
Deployed in Germany Should Return Home, " LE MONDE interview,
8-9 July 1990, p. 5, translated and reprinted in " Mitterrand




IV. NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CORRELATION OF FORCES
The shift in emphasis toward an increased reliance on what
has been dubbed "Intermediate Navy Nuclear Forces (INNF)," is
not, as some might suggest "the European role the Navy has
always wanted." 1 First and foremost, U.S. naval forces lack
the requisite capability to dominate or threaten controlled
escalation in a crisis situation where nuclear weapons might
be called upon to halt even a circumscribed Soviet advance
into NATO territory." An analysis of the U.S. Navy's non-
strategic nuclear capability in the European theater reveals
significant deficiencies when compared with those of the
Soviet Union. Additionally, the Navy's only air-delivered
tactical nuclear strike bombs, the Mk-57 depth/strike bomb and
the Mk-61/B strike bomb are rapidly approaching obsolescence,
with many B-57 warheads already in the process of being
retired without replacement. The B-90 nuclear depth/strike
bomb that had been scheduled to replace both weapons has been
canceled with no planned alternative.
Third, following the cancellation of the A-12 Avenger in
January 1990 by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney (naval
1 See James L. George, "INNF," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 113/6, (June 1987), 35-39.
2 The "last resort" option is consider to be the only
plausible scenario wherein the two nuclear superpowers would
consider the use of nuclear armaments vis a vis one another.
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aviation's number one priority aircraft and sorely needed
replacement for the A-6E Intruder) , the aircraft carrier is
without a long-range, all-weather stealth aircraft until
sometime after the turn of the century. The interim aircraft
selection with which to "fill the void," is an advanced
version of the F/A-18 Hornet. Despite its impressive speed and
maneuverability the Hornet lacks the critical range capability
to penetrate deep into hostile territory while at the same
time keeping the aircraft carrier battle group "out of harms
way . "
This places the Navy in a difficult situation wherein it
may lack the capacity to execute basic elements of our
national military strategy: deterrence, forward presence,
maritime superiority, and force projection. It has been
successfully argued in the past that "the success of U.S.
foreign and defense policy often rests on the Navy's ability
to respond effectively to a wide variety of contingencies,
including nuclear war at sea.... In particular, deterring
nuclear war at sea and on land is of primary concern to the
Navy's long-term planning efforts." (Kartchner, 1988, p.l)
If the Navy is to meet the challenges of a "New World
Order, " it will need to ensure that a "balanced" maritime non-
strategic nuclear force posture is formulated. The declining
value of strategic nuclear forces in world politics in a sense
increases the relative significance of non-strategic nuclear
systems. Consequently, the success of the United States'
61
evolving overall national warfighting strategy may very well
hinge on the U.S. Navy's capacity to deter or win a limited
nuclear conflict.
A. ATLANTIC TO THE URALS NON- STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE
Non-strategic nuclear forces consist of all ground-
launched, sea-launched, and air-launched nuclear capable
weapons with delivery ranges less than 5,500 kilometers (3,300
miles) . The Soviet Union is reported to have an estimated
10,000 nuclear warheads available for the European theater of
operations, while NATO is estimated to have less than 4,000.
(Bajusz and Shaw, 1990, p. 335) In the past three years theater
nuclear force deployments in Europe have undergone some
dramatic changes. In fact, so much has happened that if
current trends continue, one authority predicts that U.S. and
Soviet tactical nuclear warheads in the Atlantic to the Urals
(ATTU) zone could well number under 500 each by the middle of
this decade. (The International Institute of Strategic Studies
[IISS] , 1990, p. 214)
Starting around the mid-1970s, land-based non-
strategic nuclear forces have been subdivided by Western
military analysts into three separate classes:
battlefield/tactical, medium-range, and long-range theater
nuclear forces. 1 These classes are distinguished solely by the
1 Maritime nuclear forces will be discussed separately in
another section of this paper.
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range of the weapons system in question. Battlefield nuclear
forces (BNFs) have included weapons such as nuclear capable
artillery, rockets, and short-range ballistic missiles having
ranges under 100 kilometers (60 miles). The range of these
systems limits their employment to the vicinity of the
tactical battle. This has caused some to suggest that if NATO
forces ever decided to use these weapons, their limited range
alone may convey to an aggressor a desire to limit the
escalation of a conflict. (Reed, 1983, p. 35)
NATO has an estimated 5,705 nuclear capable artillery
pieces consisting of both 8-inch and 155-mm caliber towed and
self-propelled nuclear capable howitzers. NATO's principle
ground launched nuclear weapons system is the Lance missile.
The are 88 Lance missile launchers in Europe, distributed
among three NATO allies -- Germany with 76 launchers, Italy
with six, and the Netherlands with six. Each Lance has
approximately 20 missiles with a range of 110km (66mi) (IISS,
1990, p. 219)
On 3 May 1990 President George Bush announced his decision
to terminate the Follow-on-to-Lance program (FOTL) while at
the same time he canceled any further modernization of U.S.
nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe. Two months later,
at the July 1990 London NATO Summit, it was further announced
that once short-range nuclear force (SNF) negotiations were
underway, the U.S. would propose to eliminate all nuclear
artillery shells from Europe in exchange for reciprocal action
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by the Soviet Union. The Presidents move terminating the FOTL
program has been interpreted by some analysts as having set
the stage for a U.S. proposal at forthcoming SNF negotiations
that would call for total elimination of all short-range
missiles in Europe. (Bajusz, 1990, p. 336)
By comparison, the Soviet BNF arsenal is believed to
contain some 6,628 nuclear capable artillery pieces of nine
different types and three different tube sizes: 152-mm guns
and Howitzers, 203-mm Howitzers, and 240-mm mortars. Soviet
Military Power 1990 asserts that Soviet artillery
modernization has continued at an impressive rate. "About one-
third of the howitzers and guns deployed in the ATTU zone now
consist of modern, self-propelled systems. (U.S. Department of
Defense, 1990, p. 77) Concurrent with the Soviet modernization
effort, force structure changes that are reducing the size of
the artillery force are also decreasing artillery batteries
from six or eight guns to four guns throughout the force.
"These changes result in qualitative improvement in Soviet
artillery at the division level." (U.S. Department of Defense,
1990, p. 56) Soviet ground forces also employ a nuclear capable
FROG-7 (free rocket over ground) rocket. The FROG-7 rocket is
an unguided, single stage, 70km range (42mi) surface to
surface missile used to provide nuclear fire support at the
division level
.
As a result of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty concluded in Paris in November 1990, the Soviet
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Union has agreed to destroy thousands of its artillery pieces
(some of which are dual-capable) . Yet, in a apparent attempt
to circumvent the agreement, the very next month, the Soviet
Red Army began the transfer of three motorized rifle
divisions, along with their over 800 artillery pieces, to the
Soviet Navy for "coastal defense," -- thereby exempting them
from CFE limitations. These units were geographically
distributed between Arkhangelsk (in the Leningrad Military
District), Klaipeda (in the Baltic Military District), and
Semferopol (in the Odessa Military District) . (Global Affairs,
1991, p. 19) Although an arrangement was eventually worked out
that would include these forces as treaty limited equipment,
the incident raised suspicions in the West about the sincerity
of the Soviet's Defense reorganizational efforts.
While Soviet government spokesmen have indicated a certain
willingness to go along with President Bush's suggestion of
eliminating short-range nuclear forces, Soviet proposals
differ from the U.S. one in at least one key area, geographic
scope. One Soviet proposal calls for the "elimination through
withdrawal" from a 'Central European zone' all nuclear
artillery munitions as well as mines. Such an agreement would
make a "virtue out of necessity" for Soviet ground forces
leaving former Warsaw Pact states while still preserving the
sanctity of weapons storage on Soviet "national territory."
(Kortunov, 1991, p. 48) This would give the Soviet Army a
considerable stockpile of nuclear arms in the western Soviet
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Union to draw from while NATO's nuclear arms would be forced
from Germany and the Low Countries back across the Atlantic to
the United States. This Soviet zonal approach is generally
considered to be an attempt to " singularize" some NATO members
thereby reducing NATO's cohesion.
The Soviet Union controls nearly twice the number of BNF
warheads in their nuclear stockpile as NATO. If they were to
find it in their interest to accept President Bush's offer to
eradicate all nuclear artillery shells from Europe, a
significant Soviet advantage in this area would be eliminated.
If on the other hand, the Soviet leadership is unwilling (or
unable) to part with their BNF stockpile, then NATO could face
another tough modernization decision in the next decade.
Medium-range theater nuclear forces consist of those
ballistic missiles and air-delivered nuclear weapons capable
of delivery ranges between 100 to 1,000 kilometers (60 to 600
miles)
.
These weapons would be used by NATO primarily to
interdict advancing second echelon or "follow-on" forces in a
ground assault to prevent reinforcement of the forward battle
area. Because these weapons go beyond the "forward edge of the
battle area" (FEBA) they are generally thought to represent a
higher degree of escalation than the use of battlefield
nuclear weapons alone.
American forces in NATO forward deployed some 402 medium-
range strike aircraft on the continent for this role. The
majority of which are the supersonic F-4 Phantom, and the
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modern F-16 Falcon. NATO allies Belgium, Britain, Italy,
Greece, the Netherlands, and Turkey collectively have an
additional 898 dual-capable strike aircraft. These include the
two American fighters mentioned above plus the F-104
Starfighter and the British Tornado. Unclassified estimates
indicate that the largest number of NATO's nuclear gravity
bombs are stored in Germany which has about 500 weapons.
Britain is a close second with 400, and Turkey third with 225.
Italy is believed to stock almost 200 bombs while Belgium,
Greece, and the Netherlands each hold approximately 25
weapons. (Norris c , 1990, p. 48)
Soviet dual-capable medium-range air assets include
approximately 825 MiG-27 Flogger, 488 Su-17 Fitter, and 757
Su-24 Fencer attack aircraft. The supersonic Su-24 Fencer (2.3
Mach) is the most capable deep interdiction aircraft in the
tactical air force possesses a range of about 1,130km (678mi)
.
The Fencer is an all-weather, low-altitude penetrator,
reported to be highly capable in attacking fixed targets.
(Cochran, 1989, p. 234) The Su-17 Fitter tactical fighter-
bomber has a radius of action around 680km (410mi) and is
assigned a ground support /close air support role. It is
reported to have poor cockpit visibility and turning
capability, but is capable of fast acceleration up to speeds
of 2.1 Mach. The supersonic MiG-27 Flogger (1.7 Mach) is the
aircraft most often used in Soviet military exercises in the
nuclear role. The MiG-27 is the most numerous tactical fighter
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in the Soviet inventory and has a calculated mission radius of
600km (360mi) . (Cochran, 1989, p. 234)
Since Soviet troop withdrawals began from Central Europe
in the Spring 1989, some 275 first-line Su-17 Fitter, Su-24
Fencer, Su-2 5 Frogfoot and MiG-27 Flogger attack aircraft have
been transferred to Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA). "Land-based
attack aircraft of both the Soviet Air Force and Soviet Naval
Aviation have been performing an increased level of maritime
strike activity over the last several years." (U.S. Department
of Defense, 1990, p. 85) Although these aircraft are declared
to be intended primarily for wartime maritime strike role in
defense of Soviet territory, nonetheless, they also furnish
SNA with tremendous offensive potential on NATO's primarily
maritime northern and southern flanks. The expanding role of
Soviet Naval Aviation is most worrisome to NATO's allies
positioned along the flanks, particularly Norway which has
encountered the brunt of a Soviet build-up of forces on the
Kola peninsula in recent years
.
In forthcoming SNF negotiations the Soviet Union is
expected to seek deep cuts both in nuclear-capable aircraft
and their associated weapons which are qualitatively superior
to Soviet systems. Furthermore, the USSR will probably attempt
to limit modernization of current air-delivered weaponry and
ban new types of weapons systems in order to block NATO's
options for a new TASM (Kortunov, 19 91, p. 48) . The removal of
Pershing II missiles from Europe in accordance with the INF
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Treaty has to a certain extent forced NATO to increase
reliance on dual-capable aircraft (DCA) to cover targets
beyond the FEBA. If the NATO stockpile of air-deliverable
nuclear gravity bombs is captured by future arms control
arrangements -- or a political decision to unilaterally
withdraw these arms is made by the United States -- then
carrier-based strike aircraft will be the only nuclear-capable
assets in theater to cover this particular group of targets.
Soviet medium-range non-strategic forces are larger and
more diverse than those of NATO. The Soviet Army West of the
Urals has roughly 256 SS-21 Scarab and 564 SS-lc Scud mobile
missile launchers. The SS-lc Scud-B mobile missile has been
described as "the ground force's primary nuclear fire support
means." (U.S. Department of Defense, 1988, p. 55) It is a
liquid fueled ballistic missile with a range of 300km (180mi)
and a circular error probable (CEP) 1 of around 450 meters. The
warhead is considered to be in the 1 to ten kiloton range.
(Cochran, 1989, p. 220) The SS-21 is a retargetable, vertically
launched, guided missile with a range of 300km (180mi) and a
reported accuracy of 30 meters. It is thought to be capable of
carrying either a 10KT or 100KT yield warhead. Both the SS-21
and the FROG-7 are reloadable, and three ready to fire
1 CEP (Circular error probable) is the radius of a circle
around a target within which there is a 50% probability that
a weapon aimed at that target will fall.
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missiles are thought to be carried by a resupply vehicle
deployed with the SS-21 launchers. (Cochran, 1989, p. 197)
The SS-21 's vertical launch capability reduces the amount
of time it is required to spend in the open thereby reducing
the weapons vulnerability to detection and destruction. The
U.S. Department of Defense reported in 1990 that "The Soviet
Union's SNF modernization program includes replacing FROG
rocket launchers with SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles
organized into brigades of 18 launchers each. This improved
organizational structure increases flexibility and
responsiveness; it also simplifies command and control." (U.S.
Department of Defense, 1990, p. 55) The mobility, flexibility,
range and accuracy of the SS-21 missile systems make it the
most capable fire support weapons system in the Soviet
inventory and sought after target by NATO planners. Locating
and destroying these missiles and launchers will be paramount
to NATO's success in controlling escalation in a limited
nuclear engagement because of their serious capacity for
retaliatory strikes.
It has already been mentioned that the U.S. is expected to
propose the elimination of all SNF missiles possibly seeking
a "Third Zero." All Soviet systems comprising SNF missiles --
FROG, Scud, and the SS-21 -- are designed for conventional and
chemical as well as nuclear weapons delivery. Therefore, in
any future SNF negotiations the USSR is unlikely to accept
significant reductions of SNF missiles because such a measure
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would weaken its conventional force posture, separate from the
effects on its nuclear forces. (Bajusz, 1990, p. 339) The
Soviet Union are more likely to pursue limits on warheads than
missiles, allowing them to retain the bulk of their forces.
Long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNFs) include those
missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft with delivery ranges
between 1,000 km and 5,500 km ( 600-3 , 300mi ) . The INF Treaty
has eliminated all American and Soviet land-based cruise
missiles and ballistic missile launchers in this class,
however, the INF treaty does not limit the deployment of
nuclear-capable bomber aircraft in this range. The United
States reportedly forward deploys an estimated 170 F/B-lll
Aardvark medium-range bombers in the United Kingdom, each able
to deliver three nuclear strike bombs. (Norris d , 1991, p. 48)
The F/B-lll is also capable of carrying six nuclear short-
range attack missiles (SRAM-A) , but no known SRAM-A missiles
are deployed outside of the United States. The deep strike
penetration capability of the F-lll against modern Soviet air
defenses has been a matter of NATO concern for the past
decade. Recent reports indicate that beginning in 1992 the
USAF will return two wings of the F/B-llls to the U.S. from
Britain. They will be only partially replaced by "less than a
wing" (about 50 aircraft) of nuclear capable F-15 Eagles.
(Norris d
, 1991, p. 48)
The Soviet Union maintains a large and highly capable
long-range non-strategic nuclear bomber force of some 659
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aircraft of three different types which are assigned to both
the Strategic Air Army (SAA) and Soviet Naval Aviation (See
Table 3 below) . The twin turbojet Tu-16 Badger is the oldest
of the three bombers, entering service in 1955, and is being
replaced by the modern Backfire. It can be armed with either
the AS-5 Kelt or the AS-6 Kingfish air-launched cruise
missiles, and has a calculated radius of action of 2,180km
(l,308mi). (IISS, 1990, p. 223) The supersonic Tu-22 Blinder
(1.4 Mach) was introduced in 1960. It has an estimated 1,500km
(900mi) radius and is armed with the AS-4 Kitchen supersonic
missile capable of both land attack and anti-ship missions.
The variable-geometry (swing) wing Tu-26 Backfire is said to
be "ideally suited" to its theater and naval anti-strike
missions. (Cochran, 1989, p. 233) The Backfire is superior to
the Badger and Blinder in combat radius (4, 430km/2 , 658mi)
,
survivability, and weapons versatility. Its low level
supersonic dash capabilities (1.92 Mach) make it a highly
proficient weapon system for anti-carrier operations. The
Backfire is armed with the AS-4 Kitchen missile and is also
believed to carry the new AS-11 Kiltar short-range attack
missile
.
In summary, reductions in Soviet theater nuclear forces
that have resulted from the INF Treaty, Soviet force
reorganization, and the doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency"
will diminish the capability of theater commanders to conduct
nuclear operations in Europe. This does not mean, however,
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that the importance of theater nuclear forces in Soviet
strategy has decreased. Short-range nuclear forces withdrawn
to Soviet territory remain readily available within the
Western Theater of Operations. (U.S. Department of Defense,
1990, p. 55)
B. SEA-BASED NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPEAN
WATERS 1
Of the five branches of the Soviet armed forces the Navy
has the most types of nuclear weapons. (Norris 9 , 1991, p. 48)
Although the number of warships in the fleet is declining,
the number of Soviet naval strike aircraft is rapidly
increasing, and the potential conversion of Yankee-class
strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) to cruise missile
carriers (SSGNs) and to attack submarines (SSNs) could
significantly increase the number of nuclear weapons at sea.
(Polmar, 1991, p. 106)
Nuclear systems in the naval non-strategic force generally
fall into a number of specific categories: anti-submarine
1 Whereas it is relatively simple to subdivide land-based
theater nuclear forces into distinct and separate range
groupings, because maritime warfare generally involves
distances relative to other combatants separate from
geographic reference, naval weapons systems are often
discussed in terms of mission: tactical, effecting the outcome
of a particular battle; or strategic, effecting the outcome of
the war. With the introduction of the multi-mission Tomahawk
cruise missile in June 1984, this distinction has become
somewhat blurred. For the purposes of this discussion,
however, the nuclear Tomahawk land attack cruise missile
(TLAM/N) is considered to be a tactical/theater nuclear asset.
73
weapons, air-delivered weapons, anti-ship missiles, sea-
launched cruise missiles, anti-air weapons, naval artillery,
and coastal defense missiles. Unlike the U.S. Navy, the Soviet
Navy maintains a robust non-strategic nuclear force posture.
A few of these categories contain only small numbers of
nuclear weapons and will be discussed first. The Soviet Navy
maintains a single coastal defense division armed with some
100 SSC-lb Sepal nuclear capable ground launched cruise
missiles. Launch sites for these weapons exist at all four
Soviet fleet areas: Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Northern, and
Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1988, p. 87) The
Soviet Navy may also stockpile nuclear artillery shells for
its 152-mm guns carried by five Sverdlov- class cruisers.
(Cochran, 1989, p. 37) In addition, the Navy is believed to own
a number of nuclear capable sea-mines, but very little
information is available regarding these weapons. The Soviet
Navy operates three kinds of nuclear capable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) : the SA-N-1 Goa, the SA-N-3 Goblet, and the
SA-N-6 Grumble. 1 Soviet naval SAMs are presumed to be carried
on 47 different surface ships with a total stockpile of around
200 nuclear warheads for these systems. (Norris 9 , 1991, p. 48)
1 It is not certain whether the SA-N-6 Grumble is nuclear
capable or not. It is deployed on nine cruisers of the Kirov-,
Slava-, and Kara-classes which could give the Soviet Navy 30
ships with nuclear anti-air capability in the year 2000. See
Norman Polmar, "Unilateral or Bilateral Nuclear Disarmament?"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 117/2/1,056 (February
1991), 105-106.
74
The Soviet navy deploys five kinds of ASW nuclear weapons:
nuclear torpedoes, SS-N-15 Starfish rocket delivered nuclear
depth bombs, SS-N-16 Stallion ASW missiles, FRAS-1 (Free
Rocket Anti-Submarine) rockets, and air-delivered nuclear
depth bombs. The SS-N-16 is a missile-launched nuclear ASW
torpedo and the SS-N-15 is a missile launched depth charge of
low kilotonage. Both of these submarine-launched ASW weapons
have a range of about 30 miles. Four SS-N-15 and SS-N-16
nuclear missiles are estimated to be deployed on each attack
submarine capable of delivering these missiles, and one
nuclear torpedo and one nuclear depth bomb exists for each
appropriate delivery platform. The result is a total of some
1,300 nuclear ASW weapons (Norris 9 , 1991, p. 48) Soviet land-
based maritime air-ASW deploys a large portion of its 57 Tu-
142 Bear F and 38 11-38 May in the waters around Europe. 1
(IISS, 1990, p. 223) The Soviets also employ ASW helicopters
deployed onboard aviation cruisers and guided missile cruisers
to conduct ASW operations in forward areas. Roughly two-thirds
of the total estimated 115 Ka-25 Hormone and 60 modern Ka-27
Helix-A ASW helos in the Soviet fleet can deliver nuclear
depth bombs in European waters. It is calculated that there
are about 400 nuclear depth bombs of two different types in
1 It was reported in July 1991 that the Be-12 Mail
maritime patrol seaplane is no longer nuclear capable. See
"Nuclear Notebook, " The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Vol.47, No. 6, (July/August 1991), 48.
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the Soviet arsenal; the newest version entering service "in
the early 1980s." (U.S. Department of Defense, 1987, p. 43)
The Soviet Navy as of mid-1991 has some 1,100 nuclear
capable sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and anti-ship
missile (ASM) launchers. The SLCMs are of seven different
types: SS-N-3 b/a,c Sepal/Shaddock, SS-N-9 Siren, SS-N-12
Sandbox, SS-N-19 Shipwreck, SS-N-21 Sampson, SS-N-22 Sunburn,
and the SS-NX-24. 1 All of these missiles with the exception
of the SS-N-3a Shaddock and the SS-N-21 are dual-capable. All
are also reported to be dedicated to anti-ship missions except
for these same two missiles which are primarily designed for
land attack roles. The SS-N-12 and the SS-N-19 are thought to
have secondary land attack roles as well. (Cochran, 1989,
p. 38) The SS-N-21 Sampson with a range of 3,000km (l,620nm) is
the latest Soviet SLCM to become operational and is remarkably
similar to the U.S. Navy's Tomahawk land attack cruise
missile. Speculation has been that the SS-21 probably can be
launched from any appropriately modified modern nuclear
powered general purpose submarine and that it is likely to be
deployed against Eurasian theater strategic targets.
Speculation has been that several specific platforms were
under consideration for employment of the new land attack
missile: the Yankee Notch-, Akula- , and possibly Victor III-
1 The SS-N-7 Starbright is reported to have been retired
this year from all Charlie I- and Papa-class submarines. See
"Nuclear Notebook, " The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "
Vol. 47, No. 6, (July/August 1991), 48.
76
and Sierra-class nuclear powered submarines (SSNs). (U.S.
Department of Defense, 1990, p. 53) However, to date the new
missiles have only been observed on AJcuIa-class submarines.
The SS-N-3, introduced in 1962, and its successor the SS-
N-12, introduced ten years later, were developed specifically
to provide the Soviet Navy with an organic capability to
attack U.S. aircraft carriers far from the USSR before they
could reach striking positions. (Cochran, 1989, p. 158) These
missiles have calculated ranges of 450km (245nm) and 550km
(300nm) respectively. Both weapons are launched from surfaced
submarines and can be delivered in a rapid salvo from deck
mounted launchers. The SS-N-19 with its 550km (300nm) range
and the SS-N-22 with a 400km (216nm) , which entered service in
1980, were also developed with the same purpose in mind. The
SS-N-19 is deployed on two of the Soviet Navy's most heavily
armed ships, the Kirov-class cruiser (20 missiles each) and
the Oscar-class submarine (24 missiles each) . These missiles
are believed to be targeted "primarily against NATO
battlegroups . " (U.S. Department of Defense, 1988, p. 83) The
SS-N-22 has been described as the Soviets highest technology
anti-ship missile and is deployed on Sovremennyy- class
destroyers and Tarantul Ill-class patrol combatants. Both
missiles have supersonic speed (2.5 Mach) and use terminal
homing guidance to their target. With this high level of
offensive nuclear striking power there can be little doubt
that the Soviet Navy is prepared to wage a nuclear war at sea
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if it should be called upon to do so by the Soviet leadership.
By comparison, the U.S. Navy maintains only three kinds of
tactical/theater nuclear weapons systems: The Mk-57 nuclear
depth/strike bomb, the Mk-61/B nuclear strike bomb, and the
nuclear Tomahawk land attack cruise missile (TLAM/N) . The Mk-
57 is a lightweight, multipurpose bomb that can be delivered
by helicopter or fixed wing aircraft as a depth bomb against
submarines, as a free-fall airburst weapon or a retarded
"laydown" bomb against surface targets. (Hanson, 1988, p. 164)
First introduced in 1963, the Mk-57 (B-57 warhead) has an
approximate yield reported to be in the sub-kiloton to 20-
kiloton range. (Polmar, 1991, p. 105) There are an estimated
600 B-57 strike bomb warheads in the U.S. nuclear stockpile
along with 550 B-57 depth bomb warheads. (Norris f , 1991, p. 49)
The almost 30-year old B-57 warhead has been slated for
retirement and replacement by the mid-1990s, however,
replacement now seems doubtful following the cancellation of
the proposed B-90 weapon.
Three U.S. Navy ASW platforms are certified to deliver the
Mk-57 nuclear depth bomb: the carrier-based S-3A/B Viking
fixed wing jet, the SH-3 Sea King helicopter, and the land-
based P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) . There are
approximately 75 S-3A/B Vikings with a range of 575 km (310nm)
deployed aboard aircraft carriers assigned to the European
theater. (IISS, 1990, p. 218) The S-3A/B is assigned to provide
outer zone (100-330nm) ASW in support of the aircraft carrier
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battle group (CVBG) . It is armed with 2 Mk-57 depth bombs. The
SH-3 Sea King normally deploys onboard an aircraft carrier or
escort ship to provide inner zone (out to lOOnm) ASW . The SH-3
may be armed with one Mk-57 depth bomb. The SH-3 is currently
being replaced in the fleet with the SH-60F Seahawk which is
reportedly not nuclear capable. (Norris, 1990, p. 48) The land-
based P-3 Orion MPA is the Navy's principle open ocean air-ASW
platform. The P-3's mission radius is greater than 1,100 km
(594nm) and once "on-station" the aircraft can remain there
for as long as eight hours. The Orion is thought to be armed
with at least two Mk-57 depth bombs. (IISS, 1990, p. 218)
Several other NATO countries operate a collective 63
maritime patrol aircraft which include the P-3 Orion, the
highly capable British Nimrod, and the French Atlantic . In
wartime NATO's non-nuclear allies -- the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, and Spain -- would fly to NATO nuclear storage
facilities where they could also be armed with B-57 nuclear
depth bombs
.
Until recently the U.S. Navy also owned anti-submarine
rockets similar to the Soviet SS-N-15 and SS-N-16 as well as
a nuclear capable surface to air missile. In the Spring 1989,
however, the Navy decided to phase out three of its tactical
nuclear weapons: the ASROC ship-launched ASW rocket, the
SUBROC submarine-launched ASW missile, and the Terrier nuclear
antiaircraft missile. The Terrier was the Navy's only nuclear
capable air defense system. Its departure has left the Navy
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with only conventional air defense weapons. Michael Gordon
writing for The New York Times commented that "The move
reflects budgetary pressures as well as growing sentiment in
the Navy that short-range nuclear weapons for ocean combat
with enemy submarines and airplanes have limited value in
defending the fleet." (Gordon, 1989, Seel, p.l)
Certainly there have always been advantages and
disadvantages to using nuclear weapons for anti-submarine
warfare. On the one hand, the "lethal radius" of a nuclear
weapon is much greater than that of a conventional weapon
thereby helping the user overcome problems in resolving target
ambiguity. It has generally been considered that this type of
ambiguity resolution serves the Soviet Navy more so than the
U.S. Navy which is considered to have more capable ASW sensors
than the Soviet Union. However, against tommorrow's modern
Soviet high-speed, double-hulled submarines there is always
the danger that conventional U.S. torpedoes may at some point
become ineffective. Proponents therefore recommend the Navy
maintain a nuclear ASW capability to hedge against such
unforseen circumstances. (Polmar, 1991, p. 106)
On the other hand, the enormous lethal blast of nuclear
weapons may also endanger their delivery platforms, either by
blast effects or by radioactive contamination from the "base
surge" as explosive energy from the underwater detonation
rises to the surface. In addition, the tremendous amount of
underwater turbulence resulting from the nuclear detonation
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results in "blue out" for passive and active sonar,
effectively blinding any sensor for a long time. (Hanson,
1988, p. 206)
Perhaps most important in the Navy's decision to retire
these tactical nuclear weapons, was the belief that they
contributed very little to deterrence of a nuclear attack on
U.S. naval forces. The capability to retaliate for a Soviet
nuclear strike on an American vessel with a nuclear ASW rocket
on a Soviet naval vessel was considered by most Navy officials
to be insufficient to deter the initial attack. Instead, the
Navy elected to shift toward a deterrent strategy that would
hold at risk Soviet naval and air bases on Soviet territory.
This new approach was made possible in the mid-1980s only
after the introduction of long-range TLAM/N missiles fired
from submarines and surface ships which, by the time of this
decision, had been widely dispersed throughout the fleet. Vice
Admiral Henry C. Mustin, former Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations explained the
logic behind this decision: "If you want to deter [the
Soviets] you have to deter them with a weapon that scares them
the most. We now see that the thing that the Soviets are most
concerned about is attacks on Mother Russia." (Gordon, 1989,
Seel, p. 28)
This decision marked a turning point in the way the U.S.
Navy views its maritime theater nuclear force requirements.
For tactical use at sea, the Soviet nuclear arsenal had become
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far more robust than our own. Of particular concern, their
large numbers of antiship cruise missiles targeted primarily
against NATO carrier battlegroups . In addition, the Soviet
Navy stands to gain the most from employment of nuclear
weapons at sea due to the inherent vulnerability of large U.S.
surface warships at sea. Therefore, the U.S. Navy essentially
"abandoned the notion of nuclear warfighting and has shifted
to a view of theater nuclear weapons that envisions them
purely as deterrents to Soviet nuclear escalation." (Rhodes,
1990, p. 101)
The Mk-57 nuclear depth/strike bomb has already been
discussed as an ASW weapon. As a strike weapon the Mk-57 can
be delivered by both Navy and Marine Corps A-6E Intruder and
F/A-18 Hornet carrier based aircraft. 1 Both aircraft are also
capable of delivering the Mk-61/B tactical strike weapon. The
Mk-61/B, like the B-57, is a lightweight bomb that has been in
service since 1975. (Norris f , 1991, p. 49) The B-61-2, -5
warhead is reported to have a yield in the 10 kiloton to 345
kiloton range with an estimated 625 warheads in the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile. (Norris f , 1991, p. 49) The Mk-61/B
has been replacing some of the aging Mk-57 strike bombs as
they have become obsolete.
1 Not all F/A-18 aircraft are reported to be nuclear
capable. Only a certain number of "specially wired" planes are
able to perform nuclear missions.
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The B-90 tactical nuclear depth/strike bomb was scheduled
to enter the U.S. Navy inventory in fiscal year 1993. It was
the only tactical nuclear weapon under development by the U.S.
Navy . (Polmar, 1991, p. 105) According to Robert S. Norris of
the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Navy neglected to
include the B-90 in its 1992 budget request and as a result
funding for the weapon has been canceled. (Norris d , 1991,
p. 48) The B-90 was thought by some to have survived earlier
budget cutting because it was "free," meaning the cost of
researching and producing the weapon is borne by the Energy-
Department, not the Navy. 1 Therefore, it seems unlikely that
the Navy budget would be the deciding factor.
Further study reveals that problems plaguing the nuclear
weapons industry may have had greater impact on a decision to
cancel the B-90 than Navy policy or planning. In January 1990
the Washington Post reported that a "government source"
asserted that "nuclear weapons production, which heretofore
has been set by the Pentagon based solely on military
requirements, is [now] being debated in an interagency process
that is putting new emphasis on costs and Energy Department
concerns about safety." (Pincus, 1990, p.A6) With the
perceived reduction of the Soviet threat and a reduced
1 See Damian Durrant and Joshua Handler, "Deep Six the B-
90 Bomb, " The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.46, No. 5,
(June 1990) , 20.
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emphasis on ASW in the U.S. Navy support in Washington for the
B-90 seems to have evaporated.
The impact of the B-90 nuclear depth/strike bomb
cancellation will be felt mostly by maritime air-ASW forces as
the Mk-57 depth bomb is retired without replacement. In the
past year alone, the B-57 depth bomb stockpile was reduced by
one-third from an estimated 825 warheads in June 1990 to an
approximate 550 warheads in June 1991. (Norris f
, 1990/1991,
p. 48/49) At this rate of retirement, by mid-1993 the U.S. Navy
nuclear depth bomb stockpile will be entirely depleted.
Similarly, the B-57 nuclear strike bomb stocks declined by
nearly 25 percent, from 775 warheads in mid-1990 to 600
warheads today. (Norris f , 1990/1991, p. 48/49) Without a
replacement weapon system the B-57 strike bomb stockpile will
be empty by the middle of the decade. This would leave the
Navy with a stockpile of nuclear air-deliverable strike bombs
of around 62 5 weapons by the middle of the decade (assuming no
further reductions in the B-61-2,-5 stockpile) .
This stockpile would then have to be divided between the
Atlantic and Pacific commands which would leave roughly 300
warheads available for use in the European theater. If 25
percent of these weapons are held in reserve then SACEUR is
left with about 225 sea-based nuclear gravity bombs to carry
forth theater nuclear operations. Would this be enough weapons
to accomplish NATO policy objectives in support of ground
forces? According to Colonel Jean Reed, U.S. Army, a typical
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tactical nuclear weapons package might contain as many as 50-
100 nuclear weapons. By definition "A package is a discreet
grouping of nuclear weapons for employment in a specified area
during a short time period to support a corps tactical
mission. " [italics in original] (Reed, 1983, p. 42) Therefore,
the theater commander would theoretically have only two or
three packages available to "win the war."
The two U.S. aircraft carrier strike platforms that would
deliver the Mk-57 and the Mk-61/B for the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps are the A-6E Intruder and F/A-18 Hornet. The subsonic A-
6E Intruder has an unrefueled mission radius of approximately
1,250km (675nm) . The A-6, first introduced in 1963 during the
Vietnam war, can be armed with three nuclear weapons for
delivery against surface targets at sea or on land. Normally
there are ten A-6E attack aircraft per carrier airwing,
however, future plans indicate this number may be increased to
14 as the number of carrier airwings are reduced from 15 to
12 . Following the cancellation of the A-12 Avenger funding has
been made available to modify nearly all A-6Es in the
inventory to give it the necessary survivability through the
1990s. The new A-6Fs are scheduled to receive state-of-the-art
electronics, weapons, and aircraft systems as part of an
overall Systems Weapons Improvement Program (SWIP) . (Serig,
1991, p. 16) These modifications are designed to allow the A-6F
to continue performing the long-range all-weather strike
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mission until a new long-range stealth aircraft becomes
operational sometime after the turn of the century.
The aircraft carrier's second nuclear strike platform, the
F/A-18 Hornet, entered service in 1982 as a replacement for
the venerable A-7 Corsair. The supersonic F/A-18C/D (2.2
Mach) has an estimated mission radius of 850km (460nm)
unrefueled, and can be armed with two nuclear weapons. The
Hornet 's low radar cross-section, high-speed, maneuverability,
and integrated weapons system performance make it a highly
respected strike platform despite its range limitations. In
fact, the Pentagon recently selected an advanced version of
the F/A-18 Hornet over the F-14 Tomcat to "fill the void" left
by the A-12 cancellation until the AX can be produced. 1
The principle criticism of the F/A-18E/F selection is the
limited range of the aircraft. The planned range of the A-12
was reported to "greatly exceed that of the A-6E." (Sweetman,
1990, p. 323) However, the advanced F/A-18E/F chosen to fill
the gap will have only about three-fourths the range of the
Intruder. The aircraft's electronics, weapons and systems
upgrades require major airframe-engine changes, a larger wing,
higher thrust engines, and fuselage plugs to accommodate
1 The AX is to be the U.S. Navy's next generation
Advanced Tactical Fighter currently under development. It is
reported to be a totally modern aircraft, stealthy and with
advanced engines and avionics with a range to match the A-
12 's, which it was suppose to escort. See Bill Sweetman,
"Looking for the A-12 Alternative" Jane's Defense Weekly, 19
January 1991, p. 80.
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increased internal fuel. (Kennedy, 1991, p. 165) Critics of the
plan charge that "while additional fuel tanks would improve
the aircraft's range to a degree, they were designed
specifically to compensate for the additional empty weight of
the F/A-18 E/F itself -- which will absorb much of the gains."
(Kennedy, 1991. p. 165) F/A-18 Hornets in the Gulf War have
been criticized for their low payload-range capability,
resulting in heavy aerial refuelling requirements. (Kennedy,
1991, p. 165) For example, typical strike packages consisting
of 24-26 aircraft on a 650 nautical-mile strike from the Red
Sea required pre-target and post-target airborne refueling "to
the tune of 514,000 pounds" for an F/A-18 Wing. (Mixson, 1991,
p. 39) This incredible fact prompted Rear Admiral Riley Mixson
to proclaim: "By far, the most pressing need [for Navy strike
assets] is to develop a true 700-nautical-mile standoff
capability." (Mixson, 1991, p. 39)
Range will surely be one of the most important
considerations in planning and executing a limited nuclear
strike utilizing carrier-based nuclear assets. There will
always be a requirement to protect the "high value" aircraft
carrier and this will undoubtably position it well "out of
harm's way." Thus, ensuring the carrier's survivability will
require that naval strike aircraft be capable of increasingly
longer ranges to ingress cleanly to the target area without
the need for refuelling from land-based tankers.
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The U.S. Navy's third type of tactical/theater nuclear
weapon system is the BGM-109A nuclear Tomahawk land attack
cruise missile (TLAM/N)
. The TLAM/N subsonic cruise missile
entered service in June 1984. It delivers a W-80 nuclear
warhead with a selectable yield of five to 150 kilotons.
(Polmar, 1991, p. 105) TLAM/N is deployed aboard Los Angeles-
class submarines (SSNs), Arleigh Burke-class destroyers,
Spruance-class destroyers, and Ticonderoga-c lass cruisers, all
utilizing vertical launch systems (VLS) . According to recent
unclassified estimates, some 350 weapons are now in service.
The originally planned goal of 758 weapons for 200 ships and
submarines has been scaled down to 637 weapons for 175
platforms
.
The TLAM/N flies at subsonic speed (540mi/hr) and has a
range of approximately 2,500km (l,350nm). The "technical
virtuosity" of the Tomahawk's guidance systems give it the
reported capacity to come within 100 feet of the designated
target with its 200 kiloton warhead. (Garrett, 1989, p. 52)
Deployment of the TLAM/N has dispersed the U.S. Navy's nuclear
striking power amongst so many platforms that it would be
virtually impossible for the Soviets to eliminate the American
nuclear maritime retaliatory threat. (Friedman, 1988, p. 119)
The TLAM/N could be assigned to any one of four distinct
missions : a strategic nuclear attack on the Soviet Union or
her allies, an attack on Soviet naval support facilities and
maritime air bases, support for a general land battle, and
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support for amphibious landings. (Garrett, 1989, p. 55) Given
the fact that the TLAM/N is a subsonic cruise missile most
defense analysts agree that it is not particularly well suited
for attacking time urgent strategic enemy targets such as
missile sites or C 3 installations. Instead, the utility of
this weapon is most often viewed in terms of its capacity "for
attacking fixed, heavily defended, high-value targets where
time is not of the essence and the use of ballistic missiles
or manned aircraft is deemed politically imprudent or
technically risky." (Bowen and O'Rourke, 1985, p. 96)
According to Captain Linton F. Brooks, then assigned to
the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (now Admiral
Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence), the TLAM/Ns primary
role is to be a part of the strategic reserve force to be used
only after the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. (Brooks,
1985, p. 128)
The second mission possible for TLAM/N, attack on Soviet
naval support facilities and maritime air bases has already
been suggested briefly as a punitive retaliatory measure in
response to Soviet initiation of a nuclear war at sea.
Therefore, in order to maintain the viability of this option
a portion of the TLAM/N weapons stockpile would also need to
be held in reserve to perform this mission.
If we somewhat arbitrarily divide the projected Tomahawk
nuclear stockpile into quarters to contribute to each of the
four mission areas, 50 percent of the total force would
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theoretically already be eliminated from the theater
commanders arsenal. The remaining 50 percent of all surface
and submarine launched weapons would then be available for
SACEUR in support of the land battle or an amphibious landing.
Based on projected TLAM/N (W80-0) stockpile estimates into the
second half of the decade, this would make available nearly
160 weapons. If you subtract another 25 percent of this total
due to attrition during the conventional phase of the
conflict, perhaps 120 weapons would be available.
Again, we must ask is this enough to meet U.S. and NATO
policy objectives? If the objective is to fight and win a
limited nuclear engagement, probably yes. Why? Because the
greatest contribution which TLAM/N makes to the U.S. Navy is
in the dispersal of its nuclear force amongst a variety of
platforms capable of striking Soviet targets deep in the
Russian homeland. For support of the inherently fluid land
battle outside of the Soviet homeland, however, carrier-based
strike aircraft are far superior in flexibility and
responsiveness. Therefore, TLAM/N provides an extended
deterrent "umbrella" over the carrier battle group.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The process of German denuclearization forms a central
aspect of NATO nuclear strategy in the recent past and
present. One might well argue that this trend is likely to
increase in the foreseeable future if, in fact the alliance
raises questions of nuclear weapons over the next three to
five years, this development within German politics and
society has decisive implications for the efficacy of alliance
policy. The growing unwillingness of the defended to accept
the means of their own defense forms an aspect of strategy
that will loom quite large in the future. Certain necessary
conclusions as regards issues of weapons development and
tactics derive from this conclusion. These include:
• The U.S. Navy should develop and deploy a nuclear-capable
long-range tactical air-to-surface-missile that would
improve the range and survivability of U.S. naval strike
forces against both enemy land an sea forces. An accurate
air-deliverable nuclear stand-off missile would go a long
way toward negating the Soviet Navy's capacity to dominate
escalation in a future war-at-sea scenario.
• As USAF tactical nuclear weapons are removed from Europe,
it will be essential that these weapons are made available
for U.S. naval forces. Modifications to existing B-61
warheads would seem to be a much more cost effective
replacement plan for retiring B-57 and B-61/B nuclear
depth/strike bombs than resurrecting the B-90 program.
• Navy and Department of Defense officials should reconsider
the selection of the F/A-18E/F as an interim weapon system
for the canceled A-12 . If indeed no other alternative is
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found with suitable range characteristics and overall
performance capabilities, then consideration should be
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